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A New Look at the General Counsel's
Unreviewable Discretion Not to
Issue a Complaint under the NLRA*
Jonathan B. Rosenblumt
With the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, Congress created
the office of General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB).' Section 3(d) of the Act gives the General Counsel "final
authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of
charges and issuance of complaints [regarding unfair labor practices],
and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the
Board .... -2 Though this innovation may have appeared incon-
sequential in comparison with the great substantive changes that the
Taft-Hartley Act wrought in American labor law, § 3(d) has been of
major significance for both the development and administration of na-
tional labor policy. Shortly after his office was created, Robert Den-
ham, the first General Counsel, described his powers as "broad and
absolute" and his authority "final to an outstanding degree seldom
accorded a single officer in a peacetime agency."3
Denham's appraisal assumed that no court could review the Gen-
eral Counsel's decision not to issue a complaint. Courts have generally
refused to do so.4 Instead of analyzing the General Counsel's un-
* My greatest thanks go to Professor Clyde Summers, who first called my attention
to the subject of this article and without whose constant encouragement the article
would never have reached fruition. Professor Bernard Meltzer was unstintingly generous
in sharing his insights and time with a complete stranger.
t J.D. 1977, Yale Law School.
I. The Taft-Hartley Act is the popular designation for the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947 (LMRA), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (presently codified in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C.). Title I of the LMRA amended the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
(NLRA), popularly termed the Wagner Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). The National Labor Relations Board was first
constituted under the NLRA; its functions were modified by the LMRA amendments.
2. NLRA § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970).
3. Remarks of Robert N. Denham before the Labor Relations Section of the ABA,
Cleveland, Ohio, Sept. 23, 1947, quoted in 96 CONG. REC. 3695 (1950) (Rep. Hoffman).
4. See Bays v. Miller, 524 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1976); Hernandez v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 119
(5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Holland v. Unico Corp., 81 L.R.R.M. 2736 (4th Cir. 1972);
Braden v. Herman, 468 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 916
(1973); Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 102-4
(1972); Mayer v. Ordman, 391 F.2d 889 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 925
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reviewable discretion, commentators have cited it as an established
part of our administrative law. 5 This article contends that this unre-
viewable discretion has impaired achievement of the goals of national
labor policy and is inconsistent with prevailing administrative law
doctrines. Part I examines the history of the General Counsel's office
and demonstrates the absence of any clear congressional intent regard-
ing reviewability. 6 Part II argues that the General Counsel's inde-
pendence of both Board and courts undermines the rights of charging
parties and impedes the evolution of national labor policy by allowing
low-visibility, unreviewed interpretations of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA).
Judicial review of the General Counsel's failure to issue an unfair
labor practice complaint would enhance the apparent and actual fair-
ness of the General Counsel's decisions and would stimulate more
vigorous exploration and enforcement of the rights afforded by the
NLRA. Part III examines the reasons courts have advanced in refusing
to review the General Counsel's decision not to issue a complaint. The
cursory manner in which the courts have treated the relevant ad-
ministrative law issues suggests their strong underlying conviction that
Congress meant to preclude review. In light of the conclusion of Part
I that Congress's intent with respect to review is unclear, the courts'
legal arguments against judicial review are found wanting. Part IV
outlines the form that judicial review should take. The proper scope
of review is dictated by the dual purpose it must serve: to protect
private parties from arbitrary treatment of their complaints and to
ensure that new and important questions requiring interpretation of
the NLRA are settled initially by the Board and ultimately by the
courts reviewing Board decisions.
(1968); United Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Ordman, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967); Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 295 F.2d 526 (3d
Cir. 1961) (per curiam), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 813 (1962); Bandlow v. Rothman, 278 F.2d
866 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 909 (1960); General Drivers Local 886
v. NLRB, 179 F.2d 492 (10th Cir. 1950); Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306 (lst Cir. 1948)
(per curiam); Grolnick v. Furniture Workers Local 75A-75B, 91 L.R.R.M. 2558 (D. Md.
1976); Hennepin Broadcasting Assocs., Inc. v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 932 (D. Minn. 1975).
5. See, e.g., Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to
Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367, 368 (1968); Note, The Charging Party Before
the NLRB: A Private Right in the Public Inteiest, 32 U. CHi. L. REV. 786, 787-88 (1965).
But see McClintock, The Unreviewable Power of the General Counsel-Partial Enforce-
ment of the Labor Act, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 79 (1976) (arguing for judicial review of Gen-
eral Counsel's refusals to issue unfair labor practice complaints).
6. Congressional intent in this context refers not only to specific views on judicial
review, but also to the policies meant to be served by § 3(d). In the absence of a clear
legislative intent to preclude review, courts will consider whether such review is con-
sistent with the statutory scheme and purposes. See, e.g., Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243,
1249-51 (1st Cir. 1970). See generally Saferstein, supra note 5, at 371, 377.
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I. A History of the Office of General Counsel: Congress
and the Issue of Reviewability
A. Board Procedures Under the Wagner Act
From the time of its creation by the Wagner Act in 1935, 7 the
National Labor Relations Board found its procedures under attack.
Early criticism of the Board's alleged procedural irregularities was
designed in large part to undermine public support for the Wagner
Act's substantive provisions.8 Among the most frequently aired charges
was that the Board served as "judge, jury and prosecutor" of the cases
before it.9 In 1940, a Special House Committee to Investigate the
National Labor Relations Board (the "Smith Committee") asserted
that the Board solicited litigation either to establish a point of law or
to harass management. 10 As a solution, the Committee recommended
7. NLRA § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1970). The Board's primary responsibilities under
the NLRA are to prevent unfair labor practices, NLRA §§ 8, 10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 160
(1970 & Supp. V 1975), and to conduct union representation elections, id. § 9, 29 U.S.C.
§ 159 (1970).
8. Gellhorn & Linfield, Politics and Labor Relations: An Appraisal of Criticisms of
NLRB Procedure, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 339, 340-41 (1939). Criticisms of the Board's
procedures and of the bias of its employees went hand in hand with an antipathy for
almost all its substantive decisions. The 1940 Report of the House Special Committee to
Iniestigate the National Labor Relations Board, which characterized the Board as
having radical tendencies and as entirely lacking in judicial temperament, criticized
Board procedures and devoted over half its pages to an attack on various Board deci-
sions. H.R. REP. No. 3109, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. I, at 149-52 (1940) [hereinafter cited
as SMrai Coit. REPORT]. The courts did not share the view that the Board's handling
of cases was marred by frequent procedural irregularities and substantive errors. Between
1935 and 1947, the Supreme Court upheld the Board completely in 76"%, of the cases it
heard and modified the Board's order in another 15%. The circuit courts set aside Board
orders in only 12.6% of the 705 cases they considered and remanded for further proceed-
ings in another 1.6%. See Labor Relations: Hearings on S.249 Before the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Public Welfare, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1836 (1949) (letter from NLRB Chair-
man Paul A. Herzog) [hereinafter cited as 1949 Labor Relations Hearings].
9. Gellhorn & Linfield, supra note 8, at 385; see also H.R. REP. No. 1902, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess., pt. 1, at 89 (1940) (recommending independent Administrator to prosecute
complaints) [hereinafter cited as SMITH CoiM!. INTFRIMCOmATE REPORT]. In its early years
the Board's active involhement in the selection of cases gaxe some credence to these
charges. Until 1937, Regional Directors were required to obtain authorization from the
Board before issuing a complaint. This policy derived largely from the need to settle
the constitutionality of the Act. The first Board was alert to cases that would resolve
major constitutional questions and encouraged the Regional Offices to settle or post-
pone less significant ones. H. MILLIs & E. BROWN, FROM TiE WAGNER ACT TO T.Arr-
HARTLEY 38-39 (1950).
10. See S.itiH COMMN. REPORT, supra note 8, pt. 1, at 44-48 (1940). The Committee
found that in Inland Steel Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 783, 3 L.R.R.M. 331 (1938), the NLRB had
instructed the union how to bring the issue of the necessity of a written contract before
the Board. The Committee concluded that this advice amounted to entrapment of the
company into an unfair labor practice. S.MTH COM. REPORT, supra note 8, pt. 1, at
44-45. The Committee also asserted that the Regional Director had been told to draft a
complaint that would be issued as soon as charges were filed and that a Trial Examiner
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the establishment of an independent Administrator who would per-
form the investigative and prosecutorial functions under the Act."
By 1937 the Board itself had realized the need for increased separa-
tion of its adjudicatory and prosecutorial functions. Under the pro-
cedures that emerged, the Board rarely had any direct involvement in
a case before hearing its merits, yet retained some control over the
questions it decided. If a Regional Director determined that a com-
plaint should issue, he sought approval from the Administrative
Examiners Division in Washington. Only in a particularly difficult
or novel case did the Director of that Division consult the Board. Once
approval from Washington had been obtained, the Regional Office
drafted the complaint. 12 By 1942 the decision to issue a complaint had
been totally delegated to the Regional Offices, so long as the case
presented no issues of policy or novel questions of law or fact over
which the Regional Director and the Regional Attorney disagreed.
13
A dissatisfied complainant could appeal the Regional Office's decision
to the Appeals and Review Committee in Washington, which then
made recommendations to the Board." Through this internal separa-
tion of functions, the NLRB complied with the standards of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) even before its enactment.'3
had been appointed even before the complaint was issued. Id. at 46. The Committee
found that in Berkshire Knitting Mills, 17 N.L.R.B. 239, 5 L.R.R.M. 305 (1939), the Board
had manifested a continuing readiness to proceed with charges and had ordered an
investigation of possible violations even before charges were filed by the union. Once
charges were filed, the Board delayed issuance of the complaint for nine months at the
request of the union, which was considering a strike. SMITH CONIM. REPORT, supra note
8, pt. 1, at 47-49. Two minority reports sharply contested these findings. See id. pt. 2;
SMITH COMM. INTERMEDIATE REPORT, supra note 9, pt. 2.
11. Id., pt. 1, at 89.
12. Nathanson, Separation of Functions Within Federal Administrative Agencies, 35
ILL. L. REv. 901, 911 (1941).
13. H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 9, at 55. In the rare instance where the
Regional Office sought advice on investigative or trial matters, a special committee was
convened to provide it. None of the committee members was allowed to assist the Board
in the ultimate resolution of the case. Amendments to tile National Labor Relations Act:
Hearings on H.R. 8, H.R. 725, H.R. 880, H.R. 1095, and H.R. 1096 Before the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3158, 3189 (1947) (statement of
NLRB Chairman Paul A. Herzog).
14. Members of the Committee could not subsequently adiise the Board on the
decisions in the particular case or related ones. H. MILLIS & E. BROwN, supra note 9, at 64.
15. Findling, NLRB Procedures: Effects of the Administrative Procedure .-let, 33
A.B.A. J. 14, 14, 16 (1947). Those who participated in the decision to initiate cases were
isolated in every way possible from the adjudicatory stage. Review Section attorne)s, who
analyzed the Trial Examiner's findings and drafted opinions, were forbidden to examine
office files from the investigative stage of the proceedings. Trial Examiners were set
apart as an autonomous unit of the Board. Klaus, The Taft-Hartley Experiment in
Separation of NLRB Functions, 11 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 371, 373-74 (1958).
These requirements conform to those in APA § 5(d), 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970). Section
554(d)(2) provides that an employee who presides at the reception of e idence or who
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B. Legislative Intent and the Enactment of § 3(d)
In 1947 Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act; § 3(d) of that Act
created the General Counsel's office and thereby established a formal
separation of functions for unfair labor practice cases. 1' During con-
gressional debates both proponents and opponents of the idea of a
separate official to bring complaints concentrated their attention on
whether the existing internal separation of functions adequately
protected the due process rights of parties before the Board. No atten-
tion was given to the issue of judicial review.
The provision that emerged from conference as § 3(d) was essen-
tially the House proposal. 1 7 The House documents, therefore, are
significant in determining congressional intent with respect to judicial
review. The original House version of the Taft-Hartley Act revived
the Smith Committee's recommendation of an independent Adminis-
trator whose duty it would be "to investigate charges of unfair labor
practices, to issue complaints if he has reasonable cause to believe such
charges are true, to prosecute such complaints before the Board, to
make application to the courts for enforcement of orders of the Board,
[and] to investigate representation petitions and conduct [representa-
tion] elections ...... iS The accompanying House Report provides
some support for the view that limited judicial review of the General
Counsel's decisions was contemplated. The Report describes the Ad-
ministrator as having discretion not to issue a complaint "only when
the facts the complainant alleges do not constitute an unfair practice,
or when the complainant clearly cannot prove his claim."' 19 Such a
makes the initial decision in a case may not "be responsible to or subject to the super-
vision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative
or prosecuting functions for an agency." Similarly, any employee engaged in the
performance of investigative or prosecutorial functions for an agency in a case "may not,
in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended
decision, or agency review pursuant to [§ 557], except as witness or counsel in public
proceedings." Id.
16. Section 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970), was added to the NLRA in 1947 by the
Taft-Hartley Act. See note 1 supra. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1947), reprinted in I NArIONAL LABOR REXTIoNs BOARD, LECGS.ATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANA\GEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 292, 297 (1948) (creation of independent
prosecuting official in order to prevent prejudice and unfairness in Board consideration
of cases) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
17. See IUE v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 757, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
18. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1947), reprinted in I LEGISLATIvE HISTORY,
supra note 16, at 158, 174-75. The proposed Administrator became the General Counsel
in the House-Senate Conference. The major difference between the House proposal and
§ 3(d) is that the General Counsel is not, as the proposd Administrator would have
been, a wholly independent administrative agent.
19. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 40 (1947) (emphasis added), reprinted in
I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 292, 331.
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precise expression of legislative intent implies that in all other cases a
complaint should issue. Courts in other contexts rely on similar manda-
tory language to determine whether Congress intended judicial review
of an official's failure to act.2 0 In this case, of course, the mandatory
language was not incorporated in the statute itself. And mandatory
language directed at government officials does not necessarily imply




Other contemporary documents shed little additional light on con-
gressional intent. The Senate did not independently consider the
question of statutory separation of functions. 2 2 Although the Con-
ference Report stressed that the General Counsel was to operate "in-
dependently of any direction, control, or review" by the Board,
23 it
failed to mention judicial review. Senator Taft, in his supplementary
analysis of the Conference bill, said that the General Counsel would
not have unfettered discretion because he would have to respect deci-
sions of the Board and of the courts.2 - If Senator Taft meant to
describe a statutory duty of the General Counsel, his statement would
seem to assume judicial review. Since the Board clearly could not
review the General Counsel's decision, such a duty could be enforced
20. In Devito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381, 382 (D.D.C. 1969), the court relied on the
language of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA)
§ 402(b), 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970), to hold that union members complaining of election
violations could obtain judicial review of the Secretary of Labor's decision not to file
suit. That section provides that the Secretary shall investigate complaints and that "if
he finds probable cause to believe that a violation of [LMRDA Title IV] has occurred
and has not been remedied, he shall . . . bring a civil action against the labor organiza-
tion .... " (emphasis added)
NLRA § 10(l), 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970), provides that if after investigating a charge of
certain unfair labor practices, a Regional Attorney "has reasonable cause to believe such
charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall . . . petition any United
States district court . . . for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication
of the Board with respect to such matter." (emphasis added) This language was construed
in Terminal Freight Handling Co. v. Solien, 444 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 996 (1972), to allow the charging party to seek judicial review of the Regional
Director's failure to seek an injunction after he had made a finding of reasonable cause.
21. K. DAVIS, ADMINsTRATivE LAw TREATISE 186 (Supp. 1970) (U.S. Attorneys) [herein-
after cited as DAvis TREATISE SuPP.].
22. The original Senate bill did not substantially alter the structure of the Board,
except to increase its membership from three to seven. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 8-10 (1947), reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HIsToRY, supra note 16, at 407, 414-16. An
earlier proposed revision of the NLRA included provision for a separation of functions
similar to that in § 3(d). S. 360, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). But S. 360 never passed the
Senate. Cf. id. at 1826-31 (Sen. Morse) (opposing S. 360). Section 3(d) emerged from the
Senate-House Conference, and thus was not subject to amendment before the Senate
voted on the entire Taft-Hartley Act.
23. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 37 (1947), reprinted in I LEGISLATIv E
HisTORY, supra note 16, at 505, 541.
24. 93 CONG. REC. 6859 (1947) (Sen. Taft).
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only by the courts. Yet the Senator may have been suggesting standards
the General Counsel should follow, rather than describing an enforce-
able statutory duty.
25
President Truman also called attention to the General Counsel's
broad discretion under the Taft-Hartley Act. In explaining to Con-
gress his veto of the Act, he pointed out that under § 3(d) the General
Counsel could usurp the NLRB's policymaking functions by deciding
which cases the Board would hear.20 But the relevance of judicial re-
view to this possible weakness of a bifurcated structure was not dis-
cussed. Senator George, the only senatorial supporter of the Taft-
Hartley Act to address himself specifically to this part of President
Truman's veto message, simply revived the old charge that the Board
lacked all pretense of fairness in its desire to put a CIO union in
every plant.27 The important point highlighted by Senator George's
remark is that supporters of § 3(d) paid scant attention to possible
injustices arising from a failure to prosecute. The perceived evil at
which the office of General Counsel was aimed was the overzealousness
of the old Board-too many prosecutions, not too few. 28
The evidence that most strongly suggests a congressional intent to
25. This last interpretation is the most probable one, as Senator Taft went on to
compare the General Counsel with the Attorney General, whose decision whether to
prosecute is usually thought to be unreviewable. Id.; Oversight Hearings on the National
Labor Relations Board: Hearings Before the Subcomn. on Labor-Management Relations
of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1975) (testimony
of NLRB Chairman Murphy, citing Senator Taft's remarks) [hereinafter cited as 1975
NLRB Hearings].
26. Veto Message of President Truman (June 20, 1947), reprinted in 93 CONG. REC.
7485, 7486-87 (1947). Proponents of the Taft-Hartley Act apparently did not appreciate
that the powers delegated to the General Counsel gave him a significant policymaking
capacity. See Comment, The Proper Separation of Functions for Administering Our
National Labor Relations Program, 46 ILL. L. REv. 465, 469 (1951).
27. 93 CONG. REc. 7537-38 (1947) (Sen. George). However, Senator George seemed to
assume that the General Counsel's powers would be limited:
Under [the Taft-Hartley Act] the Board is judicial. It is judicial today. Its counsel
will be a prosecutor. He will not have any extraordinary powers-nothing like the
power of the Attorney General of the United States, who decides whether criminal
actions shall be brought against anyone in the United States. Under this bill, the
counsel will have the right to make the decision as between employer and employee;
but his decision will be subject to the judicial decision of the Board and, above the
Board, the courts; and we have given the courts greater power to look into the
decisions of the Board and to provide for the redress of any injustice.
Id. at 7538.
28. Hostility to the Board was completely consistent with a favorable attitude to
judicial review. See note 27 supra. Indeed, proponents of the Taft-Hartley Act favored
judicial review as a check on Board abuses. For example, § 10(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(e) (1970), vhich entrusts courts to determine whether the Board's findings of fact
are supported by "substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole," anticipated
a more active role for the courts than had the Wagner Act. See Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
1355
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 1349, 1977
preclude review is retention of the language from the Wagner Act
describing the Board's power to issue complaints.2 9 Prior to 1947,
courts construing this language had emphasized that the Board's juris-
diction was not compulsory and that its decision whether to issue a
complaint depended on expert determinations of appropriate ad-
ministrative policy. 30 Section 3(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act simply
delegated the Board's power to the General Counsel. Thus, it might be
argued that the General Counsel's decisions are expert determinations
of administrative policy, since he has the same discretion as the pre-
1947 Board. Yet there are good reasons for not inferring congressional
intent from prior judicial interpretations of similar statutory language.
First, the reviewability of the Board's discretion not to issue a com-
plaint under the Wagner Act had not been settled.31 Moreover, the
debates over § 3(d) contain no discussion of prior judicial interpreta-
tions of the Wagner Act, nor does the legislative history yield any
evidence that Congress was influenced by such judicial precedent.
29. The Taft-Hartley amendments did not alter tile language now found in NLRA
§ 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970), which provides:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such
unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board
for such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person
a complaint stating the charges in that respect ....
30. NLRB v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 9, 18-19 (1943); Jacobsen v. NLRB,
120 F.2d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 1941).
31. Neither Jacobsen v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 96, 100 (3d Cir. 1941), nor NLRB v. Indiana
& Mich. Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 9 (1943), flatly posed the question whether the Board's
discretion not to issue a complaint was reviewable. In each case a complaint already had
issued. The courts simply contrasted the degree of the Board's discretion prior to the
issuance of a complaint to its discretion once a complaint did issue.
A plausible, if hypothetical, argument can be constructed to show that thelc was
judicial review under the Wagner Act of the Board's refusal to issue a complaint. One
of the questions that arose shortly after the enactment of Taft-Hartley was whether the
Board could decline jurisdiction of a case in which the General Counsel had issued a
complaint and over which the Board undoubtedly had jurisdiction. Courts considering
this question held that the Board could decline jurisdiction when in its expert opinion
the assertion of jurisdiction would not serve the purposes of the Act. This holding was
based on the belief that the same policy considerations that had necessitated the Board's
wide discretion in the issuance of complaints under the Wagner Act operated to give it
wide discretion in declining jurisdiction under the Taft-Hartley Act. See Haleston Drug
Stores v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951). Yet the Board's
refusal to exercise jurisdiction on policy grounds is reviewable. See Hotel Employees
Local 255 v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958) (NLRB cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction over
entire hotel industry); Office Employees Local 11 v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313, 318-20 (1957)
(NLRB cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction over labor unions, as a class, when acting as
employers); Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1952) (NLRB im-
properly dismissed complaint on grounds that boycotted businesses were essentially local
in nature). Since the Board's power to decline jurisdiction is premised on the same view
of administrative discretion that underpinned the Board's power not to issue a com-
plaint under the Wagner Act, perhaps the latter power was reviewable as well. See L.
JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 360-61 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
JUDICIAL CONTROL].
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Most importantly, policy arguments against review that might have
influenced Congress when enacting the Wagner Act were less com-
pelling under the Taft-Hartley Act. Because the Wagner Act had no
common law tradition from which to borrow, there was need for a
swift enunciation of policy and for an intake of cases best suited to
establish that policy. Only centralized control over enforcement pro-
ceedings could prevent the agency from being inundated with routine
work and free it to stake out the major parameters of the Wagner
Act.32 By divorcing judge from prosecutor, the Taft-Hartley Act re-
moved control over the intake of cases from the body charged with
interpreting the new Act. The need for broad discretion over issuance
of complaints as a necessary adjunct to effective policymaking was thus
removed.
C. Congressional Reconsideration of § 3(d)
Twice in the three years following passage of the Taft-Hartley Act,
Congress considered proposals to terminate the separation of func-
tions within the NLRB. Although the accompanying debates demon-
strated a clear recognition of the problems § 3(d) had created, the
relevance of judicial review to these problems was ignored. The posi-
tions taken with respect to the proper separation of functions con-
tinued to depend largely on perceptions of the substantive policies
followed by the Board and the General Counsel.33 In 1949 a proposal
to end the General Counsel's independent status34 passed the Senate
as part of a bill to revise the Taft-Hartley Act. Senator Taft termed
32. See Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 HARv. L. REV. 720
(1946). Professor Jaffe has made perhaps the strongest case for broad administrative
discretion in selecting cases for prosecution:
Administrative procedures are peculiarly apt where the standards are general, where
there is a need for creating and developing subcategories, where guidance rather than
punishment best conform[s] to the novelty and generality of the law. This develop-
ment should be steady, sensitively responsive to experience and to current demands,
. .. in one hackneyed word, integrated. Initially this task may be best performed by
a small group capable of exhaustive and continuous discussion and decision.
Id. at 728. Although Jaffe's argument is forceful as applied to the newly created Board in
1935, it cannot be applied to the Board today, First, § 3(d) ended the integration of
functions that is central to the argument. Second, the present Board is interpreting a
thirty-year-old statute and is thus to some extent spared "the novelty and generality of
the law" that confronted the Board in 1935. In this situation there is less need to
tolerate broad administrative discretion.
33. For example, General Counsel Denham had issued complaints against unions in a
series of cases in which the Board later declined jurisdiction. Denham consequently was
viewed as pro-management, the avatar of the Taft-Hartley Act. Hence, Senator Taft
called the Plan a plot to turn the NLRB into a labor agency. 96 CONG. REc. 6883 (1950)
(Sen. Taft).
34. S. 249 §§ 101-103, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), reprinted in S. Rr. No. 99, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. 73-79 (1949).
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this provision perhaps the most important part of the proposed amend-
ments.3 5 The bill was never voted on in the House, however, because
the Truman Administration insisted on nothing less than total repeal
of the Taft-Hartley Act.3 6 A year later the Administration submitted
Reorganization Plan No. 12, which sought to abolish the office of Gen-
eral Counsel and to transfer its functions to the Board and the Chair-
man.3 7 Although the Senate eventually rejected the Plan, its reasons
had little to do with support for a statutory separation of functions.
Leading opponents of the Plan conceded that there should be some
appeal from the General Counsel to the Board.as They concluded
merely that a Reorganization Plan was not the proper method by
which to achieve these results.39
Thus throughout the early years of the Taft-Hartley Act, congres-
sional debates focused almost exclusively on the propriety of combin-
ing the NLRB's adjudicative and prosecutorial functions under a
single administrative authority. The debates reveal little about the
Congress's attitude toward judicial review. Opponents of § 3(d) cast
themselves as defenders of the Board, and in that role paid scant at-
tention to the question of review as it affected private parties covered
by the Act.40 Occasionally they seemed to assume the unreviewability
35. 95 CoNG. REc. 8586 (1949) (Sen. Taft). Senator Taft described the criticisms of the
NLRB's bipartite structure as sufficient to justify a return to the APA requirement re-
garding internal agency separation of prosecuting and adjudicating functions. For a
discussion of the relevant APA provisions, see note 15 supra.
36. Klaus, supra note 15, at 383-84 & n.62.
37. See Reorganization Plan No. 12 of 1950, reprinted in S. REt,. No. 1516, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 16 (1950).
38. 96 CONG. REC. 6867 (1950) (Sen. Smith of N.J.).
Only Senator Taft, reversing his position of the year before, offered a theoretical de-
fense of the policy underlying § 3(d): because feelings run so high in the labor field,
there is a great need to ensure that all parties perceive themselves as fairly treated. Id.
at 3703, 6882 (1950) (Sen. Taft). Interestingly, Taft's argument would seem to cut in
favor of judicial review. Such review would give private parties some protection against
politically motivated refusals to issue a complaint.
39. Id. at 3703, 6881-82 (Sen. Taft). Senator Taft argued that the Plan's proposal to
return the General Counsel's executive and administrative functions to the NLRB
Chairman would give the latter complete control over prosecutions under the Act, since
all the General Counsel's functions could be described as administrative or executive. Id.
at 6883 (Sens. Taft & Lehman). Proponents of Reorganization Plan 12 replied by assert-
ing that "administrative functions" within the meaning of the Plan included only such
typical housekeeping chores as appointment of personnel, assignment of business to
different units, and decisions about the use of funds. All substantive powers of regula-
tion-determination of policies, formulation of rules, and adjudication of cases-would be
shared by the Chairman and the other members of the Board. Id. at 6852 (Rep. Holifield).
40. Opponents of the bifurcated administrative structure may have thought that to
discuss judicial review of the General Counsel's decisions would be to concede the
permanency of his office. Interestingly, General Counsel Denham himself made the most
concrete proposal for review. He urged Congress to grant district courts the power to
issue writs of mandamus in those cases in which the General Counsel has facts before
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of the General Counsel's decisions, but this may have been as much
debating technique as statutory analysis.4 '
II. National Labor Policy: Desirability of Judicial Review
of the General Counsel's Decisions
The tensions inhering in the General Counsel's broad power and
discretion loom especially large today, thirty years after the passage
of the Taft-Hartley Act. Each year the General Counsel and Regional
Directors process an immense number of unfair labor practice
charges.4 2 Eighty-five percent of these charges never reach the Board.
43
Although the General Counsel has for the most part discharged his
him clearly indicating a violation yet refuses to proceed. S. REP. No. 1516, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 40-41 (1950) (minority views of Sens. Humphrey, Leahy, Benton & Ives). One
implicit assumption of the proposal-which was not voted on in either House, but was
opposed in committee by supporters of a unified Board-is that where a statutory viola-
tion occurs there is no valid reason for refusing to issue a complaint.
41. The Hoover Commission Task Force assumed that the General Counsel's decisions
were not subject to judicial review. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REc. 3694-95 (1950) (Rep. Hoff-
man). Testifying on Reorganization Plan 12, Director of the Budget Frank Pace stated
that the Plan created no right to judicial review, but simply added an additional level of
internal agency review of the General Counsel's decision. Reorganization Plan No. 12
of 1950: Hearings on H. Res. 512 and H. Res. 516 Before the House Comm. on Expendi-
tures in the Executive Departments, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1950) [hereinafter cited as
1950 Hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 12]. Congressman Roosevelt argued that one
advantage of Reorganization Plan 12 was that vesting the Board with the final decision
to issue complaints might permit an aggrieved party to obtain judicial review under the
APA. Implicit in his argument is a belief that judicial review was currently unavailable.
42. See 41 NLRB ANN. RrP. 4 (Chart No. 2) (1976):







The Regional Office investigates each charge according to procedures set forth in the
NLRB FiELD MANUAL (rev. ed. 1971), which is issued by the General Counsel.
43. See 41 NLRB ANN. REP. at 5 (Chart No. 3) (1976), for a breakdown of disposition
of unfair labor practice charges in fiscal 1976:
Withdrawals (Before Complaint): 35.6%
Dismissals (Before Complaint): 35.9%
Settlements and Adjustments: 23A%
Board Orders in Contested Cases: 3.6%
Other Disposition: 1.5%
Regional Offices in fiscal 1976 found 31.2% of the charges meritorious; the remaining
68.8% were withdrawn, settled, or dismissed with possible appeal to the General Counsel.
Id. at 9 (Chart No. 5). However, only 14.6% of the charges resulted in the filing of
complaints; the remaining 16.6% were settled by the Regional Office, again with possible
appeal to the General Counsel. Id.
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duties intelligently and responsibly,44 his unreviewable discretion has
generated concern.4a Independent judicial scrutiny would help to allay
this concern: it would provide a remedy to protect the rights of
44. This article's thesis that the General Counsel's unreviewable discretion is prob-
lematic does not rest upon an assertion that the General Counsel seeks to usurp the
Board's policymaking power. In fact, most General Counsels have maintained a policy
that complaints should be issued in close cases and that enforcement should be active so
that difficult issues reach the Board. See 1975 NLRB Hearings, supra note 25, at 41
(statement of NLRB Chairman Betty Murphy); McGuiness, Effect of the Discretionary
Power of the General Counsel on the Development of the Law, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
385, 394-97 (1970).
45. See, e.g., Gabriel, The Role of the NLRB General Counsel, 26 LAB. L.J. 79, 85
(1975):
The power to refuse to issue a complaint, even after the complaint has been denied
by a Regional Director, is a power to stop the case at its source. Both [former General
Counsels] Ordman, a Democratic appointment, and Kammlholz, a Republican ap-
pointment, agree that this particular power is too vast to be exercised by one in-
dividual. Parties who have complaints denied should have the right to proceed to a
Circuit Court of Appeals on their own initiative.
Cf. Janofsky & Peterson, The Exercise of Unreviewed Administrative Discretion to Reverse
the U.S. Supreme Court: Ponsford Brothers, 25 LAB. L.J. 729 (1974) (demonstrating
abuses of the General Counsel's authority); Comment, LMRDA: Reviewability of Deci-
sions not to Prosecute Title IV Violations, 50 B.U.L. REv. 310, 315-17 (1970).
Congress likewise has evinced concern. After extensive hearings in 1968, a subcommittee
of the Senate Judiciary Committee reported:
The General Counsel thus controls the access of unions, employers, and employees
to the protection of the act. The subcommittee has been unable to determine what,
if any, standards are employed by the General Counsel in determining whether a
complaint shall issue. The unreviewable nature of many of his powers creates a risk
that they may be misused. And, unfortunately, we find that this has been the case.
SUBCOMM. ON SEPARATION OF POWERS, SENATE CONIM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 91ST CONG., 1ST
SESS., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF ADMINIsTRATIVE AGENCIES (NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD) 5 (Committee Print 1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 NLRB OVERSIGHT REPORT].
The subcommittee concluded that "[s]ome check on the power of the General Counsel
ought to be instituted. Refusals to issue a complaint ought to be appealable .... " Id.
at 30. In 1970, Senator Tower introduced S. 3671, one purpose of which was to eliminate
the General Counsel's unreviewed discretion. Section 10(b) of the bill provided for
prosecution of unfair labor practice complaints by U.S. Attorneys, with charging parties
being allowed to bring their own suits if the U.S. Attorney refused to act. S. 3671, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., § 10, reprinted in District Court Jurisdiction over Unfair Labor Practice
Cases: Hearings on S. 3671 Before the Subcoinm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Connz. on the Judiciary, 91sT Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1970); see also id. at 41, 42, 48 (state-
ment of Sen. Tower) (explaining § 10). In 1973, Senator Tower introduced a similar bill.
S. 853, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 119 CONG. REc. 4206-09 (1973). See Oversight Hear-
ing on the NLRA: Hearings on H.R. 8408, H.R. 8409, H.R. 8110, and H.R. 12822 Before
the Subcommn. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976) (statement of Robert Thompson, Chairman Labor
Relations Comm., Chamber of Commerce) (Tower Amendment praised as one solution
to problem of General Counsel's unreviewed discretion) [hereinafter cited as 1976 NLRB
Hearings]. In 1975, a subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor
questioned the Board about the General Counsel's discretion. Although loyally defending
the General Counsel, Chairman Murphy noted "the possibility of judicial review where
it can be demonstrated that the General Counsel has acted wholly arbitrarily or
capriciously" and admitted that "this 'final [generally unreviewable] authority' has
caused the Board some concern over the years." 1975 NLRB Hearings, supra note 25,
at 41.
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private parties against arbitrary or erroneous decisions, 4 6 and ensure
that labor policy is made, not by the General Counsel, but by the
body to whom Congress has entrusted the task-the NLRB.47 Although
judicial review would increase the burdens upon the administrative
process and the courts, the costs of review are outweighed by its ad-
vantages.
A. Protection of Individual Interests
Charging parties in recent years have frequently criticized the Gen-
eral Counsel and, more prominently, the Regional Offices for being
too conservative in filing complaints. This perceived conservatism
undermines public confidence in the NLRA, since parties believe they
are being denied their statutory rights. Though the NLRB Case-
handling Manual provides that "[i]n the infrequent case in which (1)
applying all relevant principles, the Region is unable to resolve
credibility, and (2) the resolution of the conflict means the difference
between dismissal and issuance of complaint, a complaint should be
issued,"48s nevertheless, Regional Offices sometimes ignore a com-
plaining individual's evidence, resolve all doubts against him, and
refuse to issue a complaint.4" Their decisions routinely are upheld by
46. See APA § 10(a), (e), 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (1970) (individual legally aggrieved by
final agency action may have judicial review). See notes 177-78 infra.
47. Cf. DeVito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381, 383 (D.D.C. 1969) (quoted in Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 572 (1975)) (judicial review ensures that Department of Labor
will enforce Title IV to effectuate broad purposes of LMRDA).
48.- NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs BOARD, CASEHANDLING MANUAL (PART ONE): UNFAIR
LABOR PRACrICE PROCEEDINGS § 10060 (1975) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as I
NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL]. On March 5, 1976, General Counsel Irving promulgated
a memorandum which stated that his office intended "'to adhere to the past practice
of administratively resolving credibility conflicts only where documentary or other ob-
jective evidence is the basis for doing so. If such evidence is not available, the issue of
credibility is best resolved through a formal hearing where the testimony of witnesses is
subject to cross-examination.'" 1976 NLRB Hearings, supra note 45, at 884 (statement of
National Lawyers Guild).
49. See 1976 NLRB Hearings, supra note 45, at 885 (statement of National Lawyers
Guild):
Tile experience of Guild member attorneys and our clients is that charges are
dismissed regardless of "objective evidence" or "inherent probabilities". Workers
bringing charges are consistently disbelieved at the investigatory stage. The cases
presented here of unfairly dismissed charges include cases where there is no ap-
parent "objective evidence" beyond witnesses' contradictory testimony; where the
circumstantial evidence supporting the charge is ignored; and where workers filing
charges without the assistance of attorneys are disregarded in the processing of
their charge.
The Guild's statement also discussed several cases in which the General Counsel ignored
precedent, relevant evidence, and workers' uncorroborated testimony and refused to issue
a complaint. See id. at 885-86. For example, in Laborers Local 300 (C.V. Holder, Inc.)
(31-CB-1753), the General Counsel resolved a credibility conflict against a hiring hall
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the General Counsel.50 Certain Regional Offices, such as Region 20
(San Francisco), are subject to continual criticism for their conservative
posture.r' Charging parties also complain that they are given in-
adequate explanations for dismissal of their charges; Regional Di-




A general indication of charging party dissatisfaction with the Gen-
eral Counsel's disposition of charges is the recent growth in the num-
ber of suits seeking judicial review of his decisions.5 3 Despite the
discriminatee, even though doubt as to the union's credibility had prompted him to issue
a complaint based on similar charges filed by other members of the same union in a
companion case (31-CB-1496, 1725). 1976 NLRB Hearings, supra note 45, at 885. The
Guild asserted that such actions deprive workers of statutory rights and undermine
national labor policy. Id. at 887. See also 1975 NLRB Hearings, supra note 25, at 404
(statement of Service & Hospital Employees Union Local 399) (alleging that Regional
Directors deny charging parties hearing to resolve questions of credibility and refuse to
file complaint unless there is "a substantial certainty" of a violation of the Act).
50. See 1976 Interim Report & Recommendations of the Chairman's Task Force on
the NLRB, reprinted in 93-I LAB. R.L. REP. (BNA) 221, 242 (1976) (in fiscal 1975 General
Counsel sustained Regional Office decisions not to issue complaints in 95% of appeals).
See generally McClintock, supra note 5, at 103-05 (criticizing General Counsel's office for
upholding summary dismissals of unfair labor practice charges and expressing skepticism
about high rate of sustained appeals).
51. See 1975 NLRB Hearings, supra note 25, at 303-04 (statement of Roland Davis)
(Board found employer violated NLRA in representation election, disagreeing with
Regional Director's failure to issue complaint); id. at 308-09 (Region 20 prone to re-
fuse to issue complaints on grounds of "insufficient evidence"); id. at 309-10 (General
Counsel overruled Region 20 and decided to bring complaint but, after reconsideration
and pressure from company lawyers, rescinded decision, without chance for union
charging party to confront employer's evidence); id. at 326 ("[The General Counsel and
regional offices refuse to issue complaints against employers far too frequently and
often fail to follow precedent calling for such issuance of complaints.") But see id. at
458-90 (statement of John Irving, NLRB General Counsel) (defending Regional Offices in
San Francisco and Los Angeles against allegations of delay and unfairness to union
charging parties).
52. See, e.g., id. at 408, 410, 413, 414-15 (statement of Service & Hospital Employees
Union Local 399) (questioning Regional Directors' ex parte dismissals of charges, without
fair consideration of unrebutted evidence of violations).
53. In the 1960s, there were roughly a dozen reported cases involving judicial review
of the General Counsel's discretion. During the last four years, the number has vastly
increased. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030, 1040-41 (8th Cir. 1976);
Union de Operadores y Canteros de la Industria del Cimento de Ponce v. NLRB, 92
L.R.R.M. 3295 (1st Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Bays v. Miller, 524 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1975);
Echols v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1975); Tensing v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 365 (6th Cir.
1975) (per curiam); National Alliance of Postal & Fed. Employees v. Klassen, 514 F.2d
189, 197 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1037 (1975); Seafarers' Int'l Union v. NLRB,
88 L.R.R.M. 2629 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Hernandez v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 119 (5th
Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Newspaper Guild Local 187 v. NLRB, 489 F.2d 416, 426 (3d
Cir. 1973); Braden v. Herman, 468 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 916 (1973); Holland v. Unico Corp., 81 L.R.R.M. 2736 (4th Cir. 1972); Saez v.
Goslee, 463 F.2d 214 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972); Grolnick v.
Furniture Workers Local 75A-75B, 91 L.R.R.M. 2558 (D. Md. 1976); Hennepin Broad-
casting Assocs., Inc. v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 932 (D. Minn. 1975); Illinois State Employees
Council 34 v. NLRB, 395 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1975), aff'd nere., 530 F.2d 979 (7th Cir.
1976); Marland One-Way Clutch Co. v. Nash, 85 L.R.R.M. 2358 (N.D. III. 1974); Lentschke
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courts' unflagging adherence to the principle of unreviewable discre-
tion, frustrated charging parties, sometimes unassisted by counsel5 4
have increasingly sought judicial relief. The suits suggest exasperation
with the General Counsel's procedures, which allow charging parties
no formal opportunity to rebut opposing evidence or refute opposing
arguments.t 5 The cases indicate the need for a meaningful judicial
hearing to assure full recognition of charging parties' rights.
Perhaps in response to this need, a few courts have evinced some
restiveness with the presumed nonreviewability of the General Coun-
sel's refusal to issue complaints.50 Courts have also shown greater
reluctance to leave other important decisions affecting the rights of
charging parties unreviewed. A number of courts have granted review
of the General Counsel's decision to settle cases informally after a
complaint has been issued.57 In so doing, the courts have recognized
the charging party's legal interest, his right to judicial scrutiny of the
General Counsel's reasons for terminating a meritorious suit, and the
v. Nash, 84 L.R.R.M. 2833 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Balc v. Steelworkers Local 13263, 84 L.R.R.M.
2558 (W.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd mem., 503 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1974); Office & Professional
Employees Local 153 v. Miller, 357 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
54. See, e.g., Echols v. NLRB, 525 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1975); Grolnick v. Furniture
Workers Local 75A-75B, 91 L.R.R.M. 2558 (D. Md. 1976); Bale v. Steelworkers Local
13263, 84 L.R.R.M. 2558 (W.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd ner., 503 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1974).
55. See, e.g., Union de Operadores y Canteros de la Industria del Cimento de Ponce
v. NLRB, 92 L.R.R.M. 3295 (1st Cir. 1976) (court acknowledging possible need for
better procedures and hearing but holding that charging party has no due process
rights); Braden v. Herman, 468 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 916 (1973) (General Counsel's procedures no violation of due process); Saez v.
Goslee, 463 F.2d 214 (1st Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972) (charging
party has insufficient interest to activate due process concern); Hennepin Broadcasting
Assocs., Inc. v. NLRB, 408 F. Supp. 932, 935 (D. Minn. 1975).
56. See, e.g., Braden v. Herman, 79 L.R.R.M. 2114, 2115-16 (W.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd,
468 F.2d 592 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 916 (1973) (Supreme Court may in
future open General Counsel's decisions to judicial scrutiny). A few district courts have
even taken jurisdiction to review decisions of the General Counsel. See Illinois State
Employees Council 34 v. NLRB, 395 F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1975), ajf'd, 530 F.2d 979
(7th Cir. 1976) (upholding General Counsel's decision as supported by law and within his
discretion); Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers Local 1184 v. Ordman, 318 F. Supp.
633 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (reversing General Counsel's refusal to investigate complaint as based
on erroneous interpretation of statute).
57. The Regional Director, as agent for the General Counsel, may settle an unfair
labor practice case before a complaint is issued. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.7 (1976). Even after
a complaint is issued, the Regional Director may withdraw it and accept a settlement,
which is not subject to Board approval, see id. § 101.9(b)(2). Neither the Board's regula-
tions nor the NLRB FIELD MANUAL (rev. ed. 1971) provides any guidance as to when an
informal, as opposed to formal, settlement is appropriate.
The decision to settle informally terminates the charging party's case without a formal
hearing, and is thus quite similar to the refusal to issue a complaint. Indeed, the Gen-
eral Counsel based his claim that informal settlement orders are unreviewable on NLRA
§ 3(d)-the same section that supports his claim of unreviewable discretion not to issue
a complaint. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.18 (1976). Yet the decision to settle a case informally has
been held reviewable. See note 58 infra.
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necessity of a judicial check against arbitrary or unlawful action by
the General Counsel or his agents.58 In ILGWU Local 415-475 v.
NLRB, 59 for example, the D.C. Circuit held that the General Counsel's
informal settlement of a case is "final action" of the Board and thus
reviewable under NLRA § 10(f), 60 even though the Board never con-
siders the settlement. The court concluded:
Section 3(d) invests the General Counsel with broad and "final
authority" over the prosecutorial aspects of the Board's administra-
tive process. Yet it is readily apparent that the prosecutorial role
may at times blend with the adjudicatory role. Also, even in its
most elemental form-for example, the unreviewable decision
whether to issue a complaint-the prosecutorial act often might,
quite properly, encompass basic policy considerations.'
The court found that the General Counsel's withdrawal of a com-
plaint pursuant to an informal settlement agreement is "essentially
adjudicatory" and "cannot meaningfully be distinguished from other
types of Board action traditionally held to be within the review provi-
sions of Section 10(f)." 6 2 The Third Circuit has gone even farther and
held that once a complaint issues, an informal settlement by the Gen-
eral Counsel is arbitrary and capricious.6 3
The rationales the courts have cited in reviewing the General
Counsel's informal settlements are equally applicable to his decisions
not to issue a complaint.6 4 As the settlement cases indicate, judicial
58. See Oshkosh Truck Corp. v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 744, 748-49 (7th Cir. 1976) (examin-
ing reasons statement supporting informal settlement); ILGWU Local 415-475 v. NLRB,
501 F.2d 823, 830-31 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (informal settlements reviewable as NLRB final
order finally terminating an unfair labor practice proceeding); Leeds & Northrup Co. v.
NLRB, 357 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1966) (charging party entitled to hearing and judicial review
of informal settlement agreements). Cf. NLRB v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, 476
F.2d 1031, 1034-37 (1st Cir. 1973) (formal settlement negotiated by General Counsel;
charging party entitled to a hearing and statement of reasons responsive to his objec-
tions); NLRB v. IBEW Local 357, 445 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1971) (similar); Concrete
Materials of Ga., Inc. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 61, 68 (5th Cir. 1971) (similar).
Both the formal and informal settlement cases stress the importance of ensuring that
the Board fulfill its task as the primary interpreter of national labor policy. Stricter
procedural requirements for entry of formal settlement orders are designed to prevent
the Board from abdicating its policymaking role through cursory consideration of the
issues involved. Judicial review of informal settlement orders encourages formal settle-
ments and placement of ultimate responsibility with the Board.
59. 501 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970) (providing for appellate court review of a "final order of
the Board" at instance of aggrieved party).
61. 501 F.2d at 831.
62. Id.
63. Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527, 531-32 (3d Cir. 1966).
64. See 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 936, 943-44 (1975). But see Terminal Freight Coopera-
tive Ass'n v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972)
(judicial review of informal settlement agreement precluded if Regional Director failed
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review would benefit the charging party: by giving him a hearing, it
would "give the party who feels himself injured and has made a com-
plaint a better chance to have his complaint remedied." 65 Moreover,
judicial scrutiny of the General Counsel's decisions may encourage
him to be more "vigilant" in issuing complaints and proposing
remedies.6
B. Development of National Labor Policy
Besides determining the statutory rights of individual charging
parties, the General Counsel actively shapes labor policy. His interpre-
tation of the Act, whether explicitly enunciated in Advice and Ap-
peals Memoranda 67 and public reports8 or outlined by his disposition
of actual cases, dictates which policy issues the Board will have the
chance to consider."" The implications of this authority were recog-
nized soon after passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. A special task force
of the Hoover Commission on the Organization of the Executive
to issue complaint). Terminal Freight reveals an inconsistency between judicial review
of informal settlement orders and the General Counsel's presumed absolute discretion
not to issue a complaint. Courts have recognized the rights of charging parties in
settlements of their meritorious charges and have held that such settlements may be
reviewed despite lack of formal Board action. See p. 1364 supra. Yet, under Terminal
Freight, by entering into an informal settlement before a complaint is issued, the Gen-
eral Counsel can elude judicial review. In fiscal 1976, 73.6% of the General Counsel's
settlements of meritorious charges were "pre-complaint settlements." See 41 NLRB ANN.
REP. 12 (Chart No. 7) (1976). Thus, the doctrine of the General Counsel's unreviewable
discretion not to issue a complaint may also shield him from judicial review of settlement
agreements.
65. Marine Engineers' Beneficial Ass'n No. 13 v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 546, 550 (3d Cir.
1953) (quoted in Leeds 9. Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527, 537 (3d Cir. 1966)).
66. Cf., e.g., Containair Sys. Corp. v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 1166, 1169, 1173 (2d Cir. 1975)
(although judicial review of formal Board settlement was unsuccessful, pressure from
charging parties stimulated Board to liberalize remedial orders).
67. Advice Memoranda discuss matters referred to the Regional Advice Branch in
Washington by the Regional Offices. See, e.g., Report of Case-Handling Developments at
NLRB (Quarter Ending March 31, 1972), reprinted in [1972] LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK
(BNA) 207, 207-08 (guidelines instructing Regional Offices to submit certain types of
cases to Regional Advice Branch for review). Appeals Memoranda (now issued as
letters to charging parties) are legal opinions of the General Counsel, issued in response
to a party's appeal to the Office of Appeals in Washington from a Regional Director's
decision to dismiss a charge for lack of merit.
68. The General Counsel issues "Quarterly Reports" detailing the theories upon
which his office relies in advising Regional Directors whether to bring complaints in
developing areas of the NLRA. See, e.g., Report on Case-Handling Developments at
NLRB, reprinted in [1975] LABOR RuAIoNs YERBooK (BNA) 236-99 (compilation of
four Quarterly Reports issued in fiscal 1975).
69. See id. at 236 (editor's introduction):
As the person vested with final authority over the issuance of complaints under
[the NLRA, as amended by] the Taft-Hartley Act, the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board plays a key role in the development of the law
under the Act. His approach in deciding whether to issue a complaint in a particular
set of circumstances can influence greatly the direction that development will take.
See McGuiness, supra note 44, at 387.
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Branch found that the General Counsel's discretion gave him virtual
rulemaking power in many areas still uncertain under the NLRA.70
Refusal to issue a complaint could preclude the Board and the courts
from clarifying some aspect of the substantive law.7' NLRB Chairman
Paul Herzog testified that the Board did not even know the kinds of
cases in which the General Counsel was refusing to issue complaints;
the General Counsel was thus in a position to make definitive inter-
pretations of the Act. Chairman Herzog put it concisely: "He who
speaks first, speaks best, for only he may speak at all."
72
Congress, however, intended that the Board decide matters of
policy. 73 Indeed, the General Counsel himself has often averred a
generalized purpose to authorize complaints "[iun cases presenting
substantial or novel issues arising under the legislation, . . so that
the Board will have an opportunity to pass on such matters."74 His
performance in this respect may be questioned. Recently, a congres-
sional subcommittee recognized that the General Counsel's unreview-
able discretion may impair the development of national labor policy
by screening important questions from the Board and reviewing
courts. 75 A number of examples help illustrate the problem, which was
recognized early in the history of the office.
76
70. 96 CONG. REC. 3695 (1950) (Rep. Hoffman).
71. See id. at 6801 (Sen. Humphrey): "In a very real sense it can be said that the
general counsel is indeed a judge, jury, and prosecutor .... [T]he judge, juror, and
prosecutor role of the general counsel stems from his unlimited authority to refuse to
issue complaints." See also id. at 3695 (Rep. Hoffman); id. at 6867-68 (Sen. Smith of N.J.).
72. 1950 Hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 12, supra note 41, at 119.
73. 93 CONG. REc. 3953 (1947) (Sen. Taft).
74. Guidelines Issued by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board
for Use of Board Regional Offices in Unfair Labor Practices Arising Under the 1971
Nonprofit Hospital Amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, reprinted in [1974] LABOR
RELATIONS YEARBOOK (BNA) 343, 343 n.2. But see 1975 NLRB Hearings, supra note 25, at
404 (statement of Service & Hospital Employees Union Local 399) (alleging that Regional
Directors, obviously ignoring this directive, are very conservative in issuing complaints
under the Nonprofit Hospital Amendments). But see id. at 41 (statement of NLRB
Chairman Betty Murphy) (longstanding policy of accommodation by which General
Counsel files complaint in close cases or cases involving novel issues).
75. See 1970 NLRB OvERsIGHT REPORT, supra note 45, at 27-28. The subcommittee con-
cluded that
the General Counsel's independent and unreviewable authority to issue complaints
has been abused and ... the lack of any check on that power has permitted it to be
exercised arbitrarily and lawlessly. As a result, congressional policy has not been
effectuated.
Id. at 28. Former General Counsel Theophil Kammholz conceded that the General
Counsel is "the final arbiter of the congressional purpose" and criticized this delegation
of unreviewed power. Congressional Oversight of Administrative Agencies (National Labor
Relations Board): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 246 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 1968
NLRB Hearings].
76. In 1950, opponents of the statutory separation of functions argued that the exis-
tence of two interpretative bodies resulted in confusion on the part of labor and manage-
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1. "Hot Cargo" Agreements under § 8(e) of the NLRA
The most notorious example of an important issue kept from the
Board's scrutiny by the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint
involved the latter's interpretation of NLRA § 8(e), which outlaws
"hot cargo" agreements.7 7 The General Counsel read the proviso of
§ 8(e)78 to permit unions in the construction industry to coerce con-
tractors into agreeing not to do business with nonunion subcon-
tractors.70 Despite academic criticism, 0 the obvious need for a Board
interpretation, and a judicial suggestion that such union conduct
might violate § 8(e),8 ' the General Counsel persisted in refusing to
issue complaints.8 2 In 1975 the Board itself expressed concern about
the General Counsel's policy,8 3 and the Supreme Court in Connell
Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100,4 an antitrust suit, held that
the proviso to § 8(e) did not authorize such subcontracting agree-
ments.8a The General Counsel finally began to issue complaints under
ment as to their respective duties. Regional Directors too were said to be confused by the
dual sets of directives they received. Because most cases are settled at the regional level,
confusion at that level could mean that conflicting policies would govern settled cases and
cases decided by the Board. Such confusion could also reduce the number of settlements.
96 CoNG. REc. 6800-02 (1950) (Sen. Humphrey).
77. NLRA § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970), makes it an unfair labor practice for a
union and employer "to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from ...dealing
in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other
person ......
78. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970):
Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a
labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the
contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction,
alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work ....
79. See Janofsky & Peterson, supra note 45, at 729 & n.l.
80. See, e.g., id. at 735:
The General Counsel has overruled Denver Building Trades, turned his back on
the legislative history of the construction industry proviso of the Act and, by ad-
ministrative fiat, closed the doors on parties whose substantial rights were materially
affected thereby. We believe this is a clear case of administrative abuse of power.
81. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154, 1171-75 (5th Cir.
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
82. See Report on Case-Handling Developments at NLRB (Quarter Ending March 31,
1971), reprinted in [1974) LABOR REtATIONS YEARBOOK (BNA) 298, 298-308. The General
Counsel's analysis is excellent, yet is written in the form of an authoritative judicial
opinion, rather than from the perspective of a prosecutor charged with bringing un-
settled issues to the attention of the Board.
83. See 1975 NLRB Hearings, supra note 25, at 41 (statement of NLRB Chairman
Betty Murphy).
84. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
85. Connell was brought as an antitrust action, since the General Counsel and Re-
gional Director had refused to issue an unfair labor practice complaint under § 8(e).
483 F.2d at 1158. The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit on the antitrust
charge, holding the proviso to § 8(e) did not immunize the subcontracting clause from
antitrust attack. 421 U.S. at 621-26, 633-35. Although the proviso on its face seems to
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the Court's interpretation in late 1975, sixteen years after § 8(e) was
enacted.86 Although the Board and courts disagreed with the Gen-
eral Counsel's interpretation of § 8(e), it took a curious antitrust case
to provide a forum for resolution of the issue.
2. Certification of Exclusive Bargaining Agent
Another important and unforeseen consequence of the General
Counsel's discretion is that it enables him to usurp the Board's ex-
clusive statutory authority to determine the appropriate bargaining
unit and to certify the exclusive bargaining representative.8 7 In many
cases the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint will lead to
automatic Board inferences regarding representation elections. Two
early cases under the Taft-Hartley Act illustrate how the General
Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint can operate indirectly to limit the
Board's certification power.
In Kinsman Transit Co.,88 it was charged that an activist union
member had been discharged four hours before an election. The
Board held that since the General Counsel had declined to bring un-
fair labor practice charges against the employer, the election must be
presumed to have been conducted fairly. In Times Square Stores
Corp.,8 9 the question was whether certain striking workers were en-
titled to vote in a representation election. This determination hinged
on whether the workers were economic strikers or unfair labor prac-
tice strikers. The Board announced a presumption that strikers are
economic strikers unless an unfair labor practice proceeding estab-
lishes otherwise. Since the General Counsel had not issued an unfair
labor practice complaint against the employer, the Board's presump-
legalize such clauses in the construction industry, the Court held that Congress intended
to limit the proviso's protection to subcontracting agreements within the context of a
collective bargaining relationship and possibly with reference to but a single job site.
Id. at 626-33.
86. See Report on Case-Handling Developments at NLRB (Quarter Ending Sept. 30,
1975), reprinted in [1975] LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK (BNA) 289, 298-99.
87. NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970), provides that the Board shall decide
"whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by [the NLRA], the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof ....... Under
NLRA § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970), if the Board finds after a hearing that a
question of representation exists, "it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall
certify the results thereof."
88. 78 N.L.R.B. 78, 22 L.R.R.M. 1165 (1948). See also 19-19 Labor Relations Hearings,
supra note 8, at 437, 482-83 (testimony of Arthur Goldberg) (citing Kinsman Transit as
example of inconsistency resulting from policy disagreements between Board and Gen-
eral Counsel).
89. 79 N.L.R.B. 361, 364-65, 22 L.R.R.M. 1373, 1374-75 (1948).
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tion governed the case and the strikers were held ineligible to vote.
The Board, eager to reduce friction with the General Counsel, refused
to decide whether the employer had committed an unfair labor prac-
tice, even though that was the underlying issue in the case. 0
3. Maintenance-of-Membership Clauses
The General Counsel's inaction has apparently withheld from the
Board any consideration of the issue whether a union contract provi-
sion requiring membership in good standing is an unfair labor prac-
tice when membership entails more than the tendering of dues.
Unions cannot enforce such a provision.9 1 But its presence in the
contract may induce workers, who otherwise would only tender dues,
to join the union and thereby subject themselves to union discipline.
92
Though such a provision has been held to be inherently deceptive
and illegal under the Railway Labor Act,9 3 no complaint has ever
been brought under the NLRA.
4. Employer Discrimination Based on Race or Sex
The General Counsel's unreviewed discretion may restrict the
development of national labor policy even where the Board and Gen-
eral Counsel concur in their interpretation of the NLRA. When the
Board interprets the NLRA more narrowly than do reviewing courts,
the General Counsel can ensure that the Board's view prevails by refus-
ing to issue complaints. For instance, the Board in 1973 held that dis-
crimination based on race, sex, or national origin is not an unfair
labor practice unless there is actual evidence of a nexus between the
alleged discriminatory conduct and restraint of employees in the
90. The General Counsel had dismissed the unfair labor practice charges because the
union had not filed the necessary non-Communist affidavits. The Board's decision thus
could not have depended on an assumption that the General Counsel refused to initiate
complaints only where there was a lack of evidence. This assumption apparently governed
Kinsman Transit Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 78, 81, 22 L.R.R.M. 1165, 1166 (1948). The Board
in Times Square Stores Corp., 79 N.L.R.B. 361, 22 L.R.R.M. 1373 (1948), did not examine
whether the purposes of the Act required deference to the General Counsel's reasons for
not issuing a complaint.
91. See Buckley v. AFTRA, 496 F.2d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 1974); ef. IAM v. Street, 367
U.S. 740, 749 (1961) (§ 2, Eleventh, of Railway Labor Act allowing union shop is constitu-
tional, provided that employees only required to give "'financial support' to unions
legally authorized to act as their collective bargaining agents"); Railway Employees'
Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956) (same). See generally Wellington, Union Fines
and H'orhers' Rights, 85 YALE L.J. 1022 (1976).
92. See Wellington, supra note 91, at 1051-52; cf. Buckley v. AFTRA, 496 F.2d 305,
312-13 (2d Cir. 1974) (noted intellectual William F. Buckley, Jr., misled into believing he
was required to join union as "'full-fledged' member").
93. Marden v. 1AM, 91 L.R.R.M. 2841, 2843 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
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exercise of their § 7 rights. 94 Although commentators have persistently
criticized the Board and General Counsel for the narrowness of this
approach,95 and some courts have read the NLRA more broadly,"" no
subsequent complaints alleging that discrimination is a per se unfair
labor practice have been filed.
5. Union Fines
A final example of the General Counsel's policymaking power
shows that even when he is correct, his failure to file a complaint can
leave a problem unresolved for years. In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Manufacturing Co.,97 the Supreme Court held that NLRA § 8(b)(1)
(A)98 permitted unions to impose "reasonable fines" on their mem-
bers, but left open the question whether unreasonably large fines
would violate the Act. 99 The General Counsel nevertheless assumed
that the issue was settled and refused to issue complaints challenging
the reasonableness of union fines until roused by grumblings from
Senator Ervin.100 Shortly thereafter, the Board itself determined that
it would not adjudge the reasonableness of union fines, only to be
94. Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272, 82 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973), enforced sub nom.
Steelworkers v. NLRB, 87 L.R.R.M. 3168 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
95. See NLRB v. Mansion House, 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973) (Board constitutionally
prohibited from requiring employer to bargain with labor organization practicing racial
discrimination); Naffziger, The NLRB Attitude on Discrimination and the Judicial
Response, 26 LAB. L.J. 21, 23-28, 32 (1976) (political conservatism of General Counsel-
whose discretion not to issue complaints is unreviewed-has led to "benign neglect" of
workers' civil rights, despite prodding by courts of appeals; need for NLRB to reconsider
Jubilee); Comment, The Inevitable Interplay of Title VII and the National Labor
Relations Act: A New Role for the NLRB, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 158, 175-79 (1974) (Mansion
House should lead Board to reconsider Jubilee); cf. Hill, The National Labor Relations
Act and the Emergence of Civil Rights Law: A New Priority in Federal Labor Policy,
11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 299, 335-36 (1976) (criticizing General Counsel for excessive
deferral policy in cases where racial issues involved). But cf. Emporium Capwell Co. v.
Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (employees' right to be free of
racial discrimination counterbalanced by demands of orderly collective bargaining process
of NLRA).
96. E.g., United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Farmers' Coop. Compress v. United Packinghouse Workers, 396 U.S. 903
(1969) (employer practice of racial discrimination violates NLRA § 8(a)(1) by dividing
workers and creating employee docility).
97. 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
98. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970):
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
[NLRA § 7]: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention
of membership therein ....
99. 388 U.S. at 192-93.
100. See 1970 NLRB OVRSICHT REPORT, supra note 45, at 27; 1968 NLRB Hearings,
supra note 75, at 259-60 (statement of Theophil Kammholz, former NLRB General
Counsel).
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reversed by the D.C. Circuit. 01 Despite the evident substantiality of
the issue involved and the contrary judicial interpretation, the Gen-
eral Counsel refused to issue any further complaints. 102 Although the
Supreme Court ultimately vindicated the Board, 10 3 the General
Counsel's reluctance to address unsettled questions caused needless
delay in the resolution of this central issue of labor policy.
III. Administrative Law: The Misapplication of Relevant Doctrines
The doctrine of nonreviewability is widely accepted, despite the
lack of clear congressional intent to preclude review and the important
labor law considerations militating in favor of a judicial check on the
discretion of the General Counsel. Courts have often resorted to
various administrative law doctrines to buttress their assumption of
nonreviewability. This reliance is misplaced.
A. The Current State of Judicial Opinion
No court has ever ordered the General Counsel to issue a complaint.
Several courts have suggested that there might be cases involving an
abuse of discretion 04 or a constitutional challenge' 05 in which relief
should be granted. But, with only two exceptions,'0 6 the courts have
not found facts warranting a departure from the general pattern of
nonreviewability. Although the Supreme Court has never confronted
the question directly, the Court has acknowledged, in a number of
opinions, the generally accepted doctrine that there is no judicial
review of the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint.'
0
The leading Supreme Court decision is Vaca v. Sipes.'0 s Writing
101. Booster Lodge No. 405, IAM, 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1970), modified,
459 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd in relevant part sub nom. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412
U.S. 67 (1973). See generally Wellington, supra note 91, at 1033-34 & n.70.
102. See, e.g., Erie Newspaper Guild Local 187 v. NLRB, 489 F.2d 416, 425-26 (3d Cir.
1973) (despite D.C. Circuit opinion, General Counsel refused to amend complaint to
include charge of excessive union fees).
103. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973), rev'g in relevant part Booster Lodge No.
405, IAM v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
104. NLRB v. IBEW Local 357, 445 F.2d 1015, 1016 n.2 (9th Cir. 1971); Retail Store
Employees Local 954 v. Rothman, 298 F.2d 330, 332 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Hourihan v.
NLRB, 201 F.2d 187, 188 nA (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 930 (1953).
105. Balanyi v. Local 1031, IBEW, 374 F.2d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 1967).
106. See note 56 supra.
107. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 138, 155 (1975) (White, J.); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967) (White, J.); Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine
Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181, 191-92 (1965). See also Amalgamated Ass'n St.
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 314-15 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
108. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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for five Justices, Justice White held that a state court had jurisdiction
to adjudicate a member's charge that his union had "arbitrarily [and]
capriciously" refused to process his grievance to the fullest extent
possible under the collective bargaining agreement. 109 The Court re-
jected the argument that state court jurisdiction was preempted under
the doctrine of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,"10
although the union's alleged actions arguably violated the NLRA. 1
The majority first noted that the prior doctrinal development of the
duty of fair representation had been judicial, and for this reason con-
cluded that the issues presented in Vaca were best not left exclusively
to the Board." 2 Secondly, the Court feared that to preclude state court
jurisdiction might deprive workers injured by discriminatory union
conduct of any remedy because of the General Counsel's unreviewable
discretion in deciding whether to issue a complaint." 3
Justice White's second ground of decision is not dispositive of the
reviewability question. He undertook no analysis; nonreviewability
was an assumed premise, treated only in a footnote." 4 Moreover, once
Justice White had established that courts are the preferred forum for
hearing a union member's charges of discrimination, he had completely
answered the preemption argument without implicating reviewability.
Indeed, an argument against preemption based upon the General
Counsel's unreviewable discretion proves too much, for it is an argu-
ment against any application of the preemption doctrine." 5 What
109. Id. at 174, 176-88.
110. 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (states cannot regulate activity arguably prohibited or
arguably protected by NLRA §§ 7, 8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1970)).
111. In Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584 (1962), enforcement
denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), the Board held that NLRA § 8(b)(l)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(1)(A) (1970), prohibits labor organizations from taking action against any em-
polyee upon considerations that are "irrelevant, invidious, or unfair." 140 N.L.R.B. at
185, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1587. The Board also held that an employer who "participates" in
such arbitrary union conduct violates § 8(a)(l), and that the employer and union violate
§§ 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2), respectively, "when for arbitrary or irrelevant reasons or upon
the basis of an unfair classification, the union attempts to cause or does cause an
employer to derogate the employment status of an employee." Id. at 186, 51 L.R.R.M.
at 1587.
112. 386 U.S. at 181.
113. Id. at 182-83.
114. Id. at 181 n.8.
115. In the first major preemption case to reach the Court after Vaca, Amalgamated
Ass'n St. Employees v. Lockridgc, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), the Regional Director had already
refused to issue a complaint on facts identical to those constituting the gravamen of the
state court action. Id. at 280 n.3. Thus, the lack of alternative remedies before the Board,
if state court treatment were preempted, was not a mere possibility, as in Vaca, but a
virtual certainty. The Court's insistence on preemption in Lockridge strongly suggests
that the Court did not attach much importance to the second ground of Justice White's
opinion in Vaca. See also id. at 314-15 (White, J., dissenting) (claiming that Vaca rested
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made protection of the Board's primary jurisdiction unwarranted in
Vaca was not that the General Counsel might refuse to issue a com-
plaint when unfair labor practices had plainly occurred. Rather, it
was that the Board and the courts had developed so little doctrine
under the unfair labor practice provisions of the NLRA to protect
union members against inadequate representation that the General
Counsel might legitimately refuse to issue a complaint. Even if the
General Counsel's decisions were reviewable, therefore, members'
remedies before the Board would be insufficient and the argument
for state court jurisdiction would remain valid.
B. Administrative Law Doctrines and Judicial Review
The cursory nature of court decisions disposing of challenges to the
General Counsel's unbridled discretion can only be traced to a firm
conviction that Congress intended to preclude review. But, as Parts I
and II of this article have demonstrated, such assumptions about con-
gressional intent are hazardous; indeed, judicial review would advance
the goals of national labor policy embodied in the NLRA and its
enforcement framework. When courts have attempted to rationalize
the doctrine of nonreviewability, they have generally relied on argu-
ments that plaintiffs lack standing because the NLRA does not confer
"private rights" but creates only "public rights," or that the General
Counsel's decisions are discretionary and therefore unreviewable.
These rationalizations are invalid under the tests of standing and
reviewability developed by the Supreme Court in the last decade.
1. Standing
The Supreme Court in 1970 announced a dual test for standing to
challenge administrative decisionmaking. Under that test, set out in
the companion cases, Association of Data Processing Service Organiza-
on two independent grounds, which would mandate a different result than that reached
by the majority of the Court).
In his opinion in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975), Justice White
again alluded to the second ground of decision in Vaca. The Court held in an opinion
by Justice White that Appeals and Advice Memoranda in which the General Counsel
instructs Regional Directors concerning the issuance of complaints are final agency
opinions, since the charging party cannot obtain review of the General Counsel's
decisions. Justice White's statement concerning review was unnecessary to his conclusion.
Finality, for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) (1970), refers only to agency and not to
judicial review. The General Counsel's decision is clearly final for agency purposes. 29
U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970).
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tions, Inc. v. Camp (ADPSO)11 and Barlow v. Collins,"7 plaintiffs
must allege that the challenged action has caused them "injury in
fact" and that the "interest sought to be protected . . . is arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question."'1 " The Court perceived the
new test as acknowledgment of a trend toward "enlargement of the
class of people who may protest administrative action." 19
Complainants challenging the General Counsel's refusal to issue a
complaint satisfy both elements of the test. They typically allege that
they have been victims of unfair labor practices, the redress of which
is made impossible by the General Counsel's inaction. The alleged
injuries may be economic, as where a complainant company has been
victimized by an illegal boycott, or they may involve the deprivation
of rights guaranteed to workers by § 7 of the NLRA. 2 0 Despite recent
indications of a narrowed application of the "injury in fact" branch
of the test,' 2 ' injuries of this sort are undoubtedly adequate. 1 22
116. 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (businesses providing data processing services have standing to
challenge a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency permitting national banks to
make data processing services available to other banks and bank customers).
117. 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (tenant farmers have standing to challenge Secretary of
Agriculture's regulation permitting more liberal assignment of their payments under the
Food and Agriculture Act).
118. 397 U.S. at 152-53. See also id. at 167-68 (Brennan, J., concurring). The "injury
in fact" and "zone of interest" tests enunciated in Barlow and ADPSO are not always
logically distinct. A judgment as to what types of injuries are sufficient to make out
"injury in fact" will often depend upon an assessment of the interests meant to be
protected by the relevant statute. See Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative
Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 491-93 (1974).
119. 397 U.S. at 154.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) (granting employees the rights, inter alia, to organize,
bargain collectively, and engage in other activities for the purpose of "mutual aid or
protection," as well as to refrain from such activities). Cases subsequent to ADPSO and
Barlow expanded the class of injuries found sufficient to constitute "injury in fact." See
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (environmental harms); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 & n.13 (1971) ("injuries other than economic harm are suf-
ficient" to give standing, citing cases) (dictum). The underlying purpose of the NLRA
would seem to make cognizable injuries other than traditional economic ones. Because
§ 7 guarantees workers' rights of self-organization, non-economic harms arising from
prohibited employer activity in violation of those rights should be cognizable as "injuries
in fact."
121. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (builders' association, association in-
terested in housing problems, and low-income and minority residents of communities
adjoining Rochester, N.Y., are without standing to challenge Rochester's allegedly restric-
tive zoning practices); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26
(1976) (low-income individuals denied hospital treatment are without standing to challenge
IRS Revenue Ruling altering requirements for classification of hospitals as charitable
organizations). To the extent that the Supreme Court in these cases has become more
stringent in applying the "injury in fact" requirement, it has undermined SCRAP, in
which the majority of the Court, per Justice Stewart, had adopted Professor Davis's
position that " 'an identifiable trifle'" is sufficient for standing. 412 U.S. at 689 n.14
(citing Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CH. L. REv. 601, 613 (1968)).
122. In Warth and Welfare Rights Organization the Court found the relationship
between plaintiffs' alleged injury and defendants' alleged wrongs so remote as to
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The standing of parties to challenge the General Counsel's refusal
to issue a complaint usually turns on a consideration of the second
element of the test, the requirement that the right being asserted be
within the "zone of interests" protected by the statute. Courts fre-
quently have described the NLRA as protecting only "public rights"
or "public interests" and have relied on this finding to support the
doctrine of nonreviewability. 123 Courts have thus implicitly analogized
the NLRA to criminal statutes and the victim of an unfair labor
practice to the victim of a crime. Just as the victim of a crime is said
to have no legal interest in a criminal prosecution, the victim of an
unfair labor practice is said to have no interest in the remedy of that
practice and thus no interest arguably protected by the NLRA.
In general, the dichotomy between statutes that protect the public
interest and those that protect private interests lacks analytical con-
tent.124 The classification of a statute into one or another group may
preclude "injury in fact." In Warth, for example, low-income plaintiffs lacked standing
because they could show little more than a remote possibility that they would have .been
able to obtain the housing they desired even if defendants had not engaged in the
challenged zoning practices. 422 U.S. at 504-07. In light of Warth and Welfare Rights
Organization, an argument might be made that the injury alleged by a party who has
unsuccessfully sought issuance of an unfair labor practice complaint does not amount to
"injury in fact." First, the injury results from the actions of union or management, but
the relief sought is against the General Counsel. Secondly, even if the party gains the
relief it requests-the issuance of a complaint-there is no assurance that the alleged
injury will be remedied. The Court cited similar reasons in Welfare Rights Organization.
The Court emphasized that while the injury was attributable to the hospitals, Treasury
Department officials were the sole defendants. 422 U.S. at 41-42. And the Court reasoned
that a grant of the relief requested would not necessarily redress the injuries alleged. Id.
at 43. However, where an administrative official is charged with the enforcement of a
particular statute, courts generally allow plaintiffs injured by statutory violations to bring
actions for judicial review. See, e.g., Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975). Moreover,
the filing of an unfair labor practice complaint would have an immediate effect on the
parties responsible for plaintiff's injury: they would be forced to establish before the
Board that they had not violated the NLRA, or to comply with the remedy the Board
decreed.
123. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 n.8 (1967); Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214,
215 (Ist Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972).
124. The "public interest/private rights" dichotomy developed in the 1930s as a
means of circumventing what were perceived to be possible constitutional infirmities in
statutes making substantial grants of power to administrative agencies. The idea that an
administrative body could grant relief against one party in favor of another was not
easily reconciled with traditional learning about the performance of Article III business
by non-Article III courts and the right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Agwilines v. NLRB, 87
F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1936). But as legal doctrine concerning administrative agencies has
grown, the fiction that NLRB proceedings have none of the characteristics of a tradi-
tional "case or controversy" between two parties has shown itself not only to be un-
necessary, but an impediment to meaningful analysis. In a long line of cases following
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), it has been held that administrative agencies may
adjudicate the liability of one party to another so long as an Article III court is em-
powered to review questions of law. The perceived infirmity arising from the lack of
jury trial is not applicable to NLRB proceedings, for the rights and duties created by
the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts do not derive from the common law, and thus their
adjudication is not within the ambit of the Seventh Amendment. See Jaffe, The In-
dividual Right to Initiate Administrative Process, 25 IovA L. REv. 485, 528 (1940).
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announce a result in a particular case, but does nothing to explain
it.125 True, the NLRA is designed to further the public interest in
industrial peace and in the uninhibited flow of commerce, but some
public interest underlies every legal rule. -12 6 The question is not
whether a statute furthers a public interest but how. The NLRA
protects the public interest by creating an elaborate set of duties which
labor and management owe to each other; it is predicated on the as-
sumption that the protection of the collective bargaining relationship
is in the 'public interest.1 27 Where particular groups are the obvious
beneficiaries of statutorily imposed duties they should have a recog-
nized legal interest in securing adherence to those duties. 2 s
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that the
NLRA creates private rights. In UAW Local 283 v. Scofield, -'" the
125. Cf. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953) ("Whatever purpose
a classification of rights as public or private may serve, it is too unsettled and ambiguous
to introduce into constitutional law as a dividing line between federal and state power
or jurisdiction.")
Under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970), parties injured by a statutory
violation can themselves sue in federal court; under the NLRA the Board can act only
after the filing of a complaint by the General Counsel. Given the similarities between
the duties that the two statutes impose, it confounds common sense to say that one allows
private suits, and the other does not, because one protects "private rights" while the
other protects "public interests."
126. See Jaffe, supra note 32, at 725 ("The enforcement of contracts is intrinsically no
less a matter of public interest than the enforcement of the traffic laiws.') See also UAW
Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 220 (1965) ("[T]he statutory pattern of the [NLRA]
does not dichotomize 'public' as opposed to 'private' interests. Rather, the two interblend
in the intricate statutory scheme.")
127. See Jaffe, supra note 124, at 524.
The Taft-Hartley Act differs from its predecessor, the Wagner Act, precisely in the
mutuality of duties it imposes on unions and employers. The Wagner Act, which im-
posed duties only on employers, was meant to vindicate a public interest-the spread of
unionization and collective bargaining. In contrast, the Taft-Hartley Act sets up the
Board as an umpire enforcing rules against both employers and unions. The Report of
the Advisory Panel on Labor Management Relations Law on the Organization of the
National Labor Relations Board, S. Doc. 81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Cox Panel Report].
128. See Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1968). Professor Jaffe has stated
the proposition clearly:
It is arguable that presumptively where the law creates duties of which identifiable
individuals are the beneficiaries-particularly where the beneficiaries regard them-
selves and are regarded as the victims of wrongful conduct, where their protection
is in part the purpose of the legislation-and provides for remedial redress, the
individuals should be heard as of right.... The impact of the proposition diminishes
as the class of beneficiaries becomes broader, undifferentiated, unidentifiable, in short
as the class approaches the "general public"; so also as the administrative action is
apprehended not as a remedy for a wrong but as approaching the norm of legisla-
tion.
Jaffe, supra note 124, at 528. See Albert, supra note 118, at 451-52.
129. 382 U.S. 205 (1965). That the NLRA creates private rights has been recognized in
other cases. In Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers Local 15 v. Eagle-Picher Mining &
Smelting Co., 325 U.S. 335, 338-39 (1945), the court allowed a party who was successful
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Court held that charged parties who are successful before the Board
can intervene as a matter of right in court of appeals review proceed-
ings, so as to " 'avoid unnecessary duplication of proceedings' " and to
increase the likelihood of obtaining "'a just result with a minimum
of technical requirements.' "130 The Court reached the same result
with regard to successful charging parties, rejecting the Board's argu-
ment that the charging party has no right of intervention because the
NLRA creates no private rights.131 The Court held that the charging
party may have vital "private rights" in the Board proceedings and
recognized that the NLRA weaves "private" and "public" interests
together in an "intricate statutory scheme."' 132
Scofield and subsequent cases recognizing the existence of "private
rights" under the NLRA undercut the argument that charging parties
have no protected legal interests.133 While continuing to use the
language of "private" and "public" rights, courts have recognized that
these categories are not mutually exclusive. As Chief Justice Warren
stated in Scofield, "[t]o employ the rhetoric of 'public interest' . . . is
not to imply that the public right excludes recognition of parochial
private interests."' 34 The various "private rights" recognized in the
cases are all derived from the basic right to be protected against unfair
labor practices. Clearly, a charging party challenging the General
Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint seeks to vindicate this basic right
and thereby asserts a claim that falls within the "zone of interests"
protected by the NLRA.
before the Board to petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, even though the
Board had elected not to seek review. More recently, private rights have been recognized
in cases allowing private parties to intervene in proceedings in courts of appeals, see pp.
1376-77 supra, and in cases reviewing both formal and informal settlement orders, see p.
1364 supra.
130. 382 U.S. at 212.
131. Id. at 218-22.
132. Id. at 220. The right to intervene in appellate review proceedings is not un-
related to the right to seek judicial review of an administrative refusal to initiate the
administrative process. In Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528 (1972), parties complaining of
union election violations were allowed to intervene in suits filed by the Secretary of
Labor to set aside those elections under Title IV of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 482(b)
(1970). Subsequently, in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975), the Court relied upon
Trbovich in holding that the complainant could obtain judicial review of the Secretary's
decision not to file a suit. Id. at 569-70.
133. See, e.g., Concrete Materials of Ga., Inc. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 61, 67 (5th Cir.
1971): "[T]he General Counsel represents the public interest in preventing the inter-
ference to interstate commerce caused by unfair labor practices, and, at the same time,
the private interest of the charging party to be free from the harm to his interests caused
by unfair labor practices." Cf. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 570, 572 (1975)
(Secretary of Labor as "lawyer" representing private interest in Title IV of LMRDA has
duty to private parties, enforceable through judicial review of decisions not to bring
suit).
134. 382 U.S. at 218.
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2. Reviewability
Once a party has established his standing to challenge agency action,
he is presumptively entitled to judicial review. 135 On the other hand,
the APA provides for two exceptions to this rule: review will be un-
available to the extent that "statutes preclude judicial review" and to
the extent that "agency action is committed to agency discretion by
law."' 36 The NLRA does not on its face preclude review. Thus any
justification for the courts' unwillingness to review the General
Counsel's decisions not to issue complaints must rest on some form of
the argument that such actions are committed to the General Counsel's
discretion by law. Usually one of two propositions is advanced: either
that Congress vested the General Counsel with unreviewable "prosecu-
torial discretion"'137 or that the statutory scheme immunizes the Gen-
135. See APA § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970): "A person suffering legal wrong because
of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."
136. APA § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970). See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 140 (1967): "[J]udicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not
be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of
Congress."
137. See, e.g., Mayer v. Ordman, 391 F.2d 889, 891 n.2 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 925 (1968) (analogizing General Counsel to United States Attorney);
Dunn v. Retail Clerks, 307 F.2d 285, 288 (6th Cir. 1962) (same); Note, Judicial Review-
ability of NLRB Rulings, 63 Nw. L. REv. 106, 116 (1968). Cf. United Elec. Contractors
Ass'n v. Ordman, 258 F. Supp. 758, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 366 F.2d 776
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967) (finding General Counsel's discretion
unreviewable and adverting to his prosecutorial duties).
Another rationale for nonreviewability, closely related to prosecutorial discretion, is
the "final order" doctrine. NLRA § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(o (1970), makes reviewable "a
final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought." Some
courts have held that the refusal to issue a complaint is not reviewable because it is a
preliminary prosecutorial decision and not a "final adjudication" of the Board granting
or denying the relief sought. Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 295 F.2d 526 (3d Cir. 1961) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 813 (1962); Lincourt v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 306 (Ist Cir.
1948) (per curiam); 43 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 936, 940 (1975). Recent cases have called this
application of the final order doctrine into question. See NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 421 U.S. 132, 158-59 (1975) (General Counsel's decision not to issue complaint is
"final opinion" made in the "adjudication of cases" under APA); ILGWU Local 415-475
v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 823, 830-31 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (General Counsel's entry into informal
settlement is final Board action under § 10(f)).
Moreover, none of the policies underlying the final order doctrine militates in favor
of precluding review of the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint. There is no
risk of premature intervention into the administrative process before the agency has had
the opportunity to formulate its position fully, since the General Counsel's determination
is final for administrative purposes. Nor are the procedures producing the General
Counsel's decision too informal to allow meaningful review. The charging party is
furnished with reasons for the refusal to issue a complaint; he may appeal an adverse
decision to the General Counsel's office in Washington. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.6, 102.19
(1976); K. DAvis, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 205-07 (1969).
Since the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint fully disposes of the merits
and is sufficiently formal to allow review, there should be judicial review of that
decision. See JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 31, at 358-59: "[A]bsent a clear intention to
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eral Counsel's decision as one of expert administrative discretion and
judgment.1s Neither argument is compelling. A conclusion that the
General Counsel's decisions are unreviewable is not supported by the
legislative history of § 3(d),'139 the case law narrowing the exceptions
to judicial review, or the Supreme Court's oft-repeated admonition
that "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a




It can be argued that Congress patterned the General Counsel's
office and duties on those of a public prosecutor and thereby vested
the General Counsel with unreviewable "prosecutorial discretion."'141
The argument, like the public rights/private rights distinction, rests
upon an analogy between criminal courts and administrative agencies.
Owing to the large number of crimes and the scarcity of money and
manpower, public prosecutors must have considerable discretion in
deciding which cases to bring to trial, which to ignore, and which to
plea bargain. Because of the dearth of regulations and clear statutory
standards governing criminal prosecutions, and because of the count-
exclude review, an action which finally denies all relief should be construed as a
statutory 'order' or, if this is not possible, should be within the general jurisdiction of
the district court." As Professor Jaffe suggests, even if the circuit courts do not find that
a refusal to issue a complaint is a final order under § 10(f), there is ample precedent
for district court review under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970). Cf. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184,
187-89 (1958) (district court has jurisdiction under § 1337 to set aside Board decisions in
§ 9 certification proceedings when Board acts in excess of statutory powers, though such
decisions are normally unreviewable); Hirsch v. McCulloch, 303 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(Board cannot decline jurisdiction over class or category of commerce in an advisory
opinion); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961) (district court
has jurisdiction to enjoin interlocutory order made in excess of Board's statutory
authority); Local 112, Int'l Union of Allied Indus. Workers v. Rothman, 209 F. Supp.
295 (D.D.C. 1962) (review under § 1337 of informal settlement orders).
138. See, e.g., Saez v. Goslee, 463 F.2d 214, 215 (Ist Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1024 (1973); Mayer v. Ordman, 391 F.2d 889, 892 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 925 (1968).
139. The legislative history of § 3(d) indicates that Congress gave no thought to the
availability of judicial review. See pp. 1353-56 supra. Upon a similar finding, the
Supreme Court in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975), approved judicial review
of the Secretary of Labor's refusal to initiate a union election suit because there was no
"showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' that Congress meant to prohibit" review.
Id. at 568. Indeed, the Court based its conclusion on the express finding that Congress
gave no "thought to the matter of the preclusion of judicial review." Id. at 567.
140. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (cited in Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975), and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971)).
141. See 93 CONG. REc. 6859 (1947) (Sen. Taft) (analogizing duties of General Counsel
to those of prosecuting attorney).
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less factual determinations that go into a decision to prosecute, many
courts have concluded that review of prosecutors' discretion is im-
practicable.
1 42
The "prosecutorial discretion" exercised by the General Counsel,
however, is narrowly confined and therefore insufficient to render
review of his decisions wholly impracticable. Unlike a criminal prose-
cutor, for example, the General Counsel has limited capacity to cite
budgetary or manpower considerations as valid reasons for failing to
bring a case before the Board.143 More importantly, the General
Counsel and his subordinates are given much clearer statutory guide-
lines concerning the investigation of cases than is the typical public
prosecutor. NLRA §§ 10(1)144 and (m)11 give investigative priority to
specified unfair labor practice charges, and § 10(l) directs the Regional
Attorney to petition for injunctive relief if he has reasonable cause to
believe certain types of violations have occurred.' 40 Congress has made
a judgment of the relative importance of statutory violations; any
further judgments by the General Counsel go beyond congressional
142. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380
(2d Cir. 1973); Newman v. United States, 383 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967). A further
argument traditionally adduced in favor of unreviewable prosecutorial discretion is that
under principles of "separation of powers," courts cannot tell criminal prosecutors, ap-
pointed by and responsible to the President, how to execute the laws of the United
States. Id. But see Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (suggesting that failure
to prosecute offenders under Federal Corrupt Practices Act is reviewable); Cox, Prosecu-
torial Discretion: An Overview, 13 Am. CRIMs. L. REV. 383, 393-411 (1976) (noting limits
on prosecutorial discretion enforceable by judicial review).
143. The proviso to NLRA § 14(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1970), states that "[tihe
Board'shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would
assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959." This proviso
would prohibit the NLRB from using budgetary or manpower constraints as justifications
for declining to exercise jurisdiction if such declination were inconsistent with pre-1959
jurisdictional standards. Since Congress precluded the Board from declining jurisdiction
for budgetary reasons, it is hardly credible that Congress left the General Counsel free
to refuse to issue a complaint for such reasons. This conclusion is strengthened by NLRA
§ 14(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1970). Under that section, state labor agencies are
permitted to take jurisdiction of labor disputes over which the NLRB has declined
jurisdiction. Section 14(c)(2) was enacted in response to Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957), which created a "no-man's land" wherein the Board could
decline to act, yet state jurisdiction was preempted. Since § 14(c)(2) is only effective to
give the states jurisdiction when the Board declines it, any ad hoc jurisdictional
standards applied by the General Counsel in refusing to file a complaint would recreate
the problem that § 14(c)(2) was meant to cure: a wrong without a remedy.
144. 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970) (mandating investigative priority for charges of secondary
boycotts and certain recognition strikes).
145. Id. § 160(m) (1970) (mandating investigative priority, except for cases given
priority under subsection (/), for charges of employment discrimination on account of
union membership or nonmembership).
146. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970) (directing Regional Attorney to file for appro-
priate injunctive relief after lie has reasonable cause to believe complaint should issue)
with id. § 160(j) (no requirement that Regional Attorney seek injunction for stated viola-
tions).
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intent. 4 7 Moreover, unlike the public prosecutor, the General Counsel
does not operate in the context of a long tradition which recognizes as
relevant to the prosecutorial decision factors other than the likelihood
of proving a statutory violation.
148
Not only are the guidelines governing the General Counsel's deci-
sions stricter than those governing the decisions of a public prosecutor,
but the institutional structure in which the General Counsel operates
precludes analogy to a district attorney. The Supreme Court ex-
plicitly rejected the analogy in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.1 4 9 The
Court noted that the General Counsel, unlike most public prosecutors,
may initiate proceedings only if a private citizen files a charge.15° Un-
like the victim of a crime, the charging party becomes a party to the
NLRB proceedings if a complaint is filed.lal And if an unfair labor
practice is found to exist, the ensuing cease and desist order will, un-
like the punishment of a defendant in a criminal case, redound spe-
cifically to the benefit of the charging party.1 52 Another difference, not
mentioned by the Court, is that victims of an unfair labor practice
147. No less disturbing than the possibility that the General Counsel will formulate
a policy inconsistent with the statutory scheme in deciding what cases to bring is the
possibility that he will follow no policy at all. The NLRB FIELD MANUAL (rev. ed. 1971),
issued by the General Counsel to guide Regional Directors, contains no rules or state-
ments of policy regarding issuance of complaints.
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck 9- Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975), may have
provided the General Counsel with an incentive to promulgate more definite guidelines
for decisionmaking. In that case, the Court held that private parties should have access
to Advice and Appeals Memoranda in which the General Counsel has taken the position
that a complaint should not issue. Because inconsistency with prior administrative caselaw
is a possible ground for overturning administrative decisions, the availability of the
Advice and Appeals Memoranda, coupled with judicial review, might force the General
Counsel to develop standards. See DAvis TREATISE SUPP., supra note 21, at 981-82.
148. In the congressional debates concerning the creation of the General Counsel's
office, there is no mention of factors that should enter into his decision not to issue a
complaint other than inability to prove a violation. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REC. 3694 (1950)
(Rep. Hoffman) ("Upon the filing of a complaint, it is [the General Counsel's] duty to
prosecute if he considers that the alleged action constitutes a violation of the law.");
p. 1353 supra.
149. 421 U.S. 132 (1975). The General Counsel contended that his Advice and Appeals
Memoranda should not be discoverable under the Freedom of Information Act because
they announce no agency policy or rule. See note 147 supra. Arguing that "he makes no
law, [the General Counsel] analogiz[ed] his authority to decide whether or not to file a
complaint to a public prosecutor's authority to decide whether a criminal case should
be brought ...." Id. at 156 n.22.
150. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(d), 160(b) (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 101.2 (1976).
151. Id. (citing UAW Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 219 (1965)).
152. Id. See Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 87 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds sub nor. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975) (rejecting analogy of
Secretary of Labor to criminal prosecutor, since in seeking to remedy union election
violations Secretary acts not only to vindicate governmental or societal interests but also
"on behalf of those individuals whose rights have been infringed"). Cf. Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973) (victim of crime does not benefit from punishment
of criminal).
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have virtually no alternative private remedies, whereas most victims of
crime have a remedy in tort.153
Finally, courts have rejected the extension of the doctrine of un-
reviewable prosecutorial discretion to agency enforcement of civil
statutes. Courts have frequently been willing to review the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion by administrators enforcing civil statutes,1 4
including the Civil Rights Act of 1964;155 the Securities Exchange
Act; 156 the Merchant Marine Act; 157 the Federal Insecticide, Fungi-
cide, and Rodenticide Act;15s and the LMRDA.1 59 These decisions re-
flect Professor Davis's warning that "the power not to prosecute may
be of greater magnitude than the power to prosecute, and it certainly
is much more abused because it is so little checked."'160
b. Agency Discretion
Closely related to the preclusion of review of prosecutorial discre-
tion 61 is the argument that the General Counsel's decisions are "com-
153. See IV. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 7-8 (4th ed. 1971).
154. See generally Note, Reviewability of Prosecutorial Discretion: Failure to Prosecute,
75 COLUM. L. Rxv. 130 (1975). In fact, courts in recent years have even expressed a
willingness to review discretionary prosecutorial decisions in criminal cases. See Nader
v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1974); NAACP v. Levi, 418 F. Supp. 1109, 1116-17 (D.D.C.
1976).
155. See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (ordering Secretary of
HEW to commence proceedings to cut off funds to schools not in compliance with Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act).
156. See Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (requiring SEC to explain its failure to require the
inclusion of petitioner's proxy material in Dow Chemical's annual proxy statement).
157. See Safir v. Gibson, 417 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1969) (remanding to Merchant
Administrator to give reasons for failure to recover subsidies from shipping lines
engaged in predatory anticompetitive practices).
158. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (re-
manding to Secretary of Agriculture for reconsideration of his refusal to suspend registra-
tion of pesticides).
159. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975) (requiring Secretary of Labor to
provide better statement of reasons for his failure to bring suit to set aside union elec-
tion); Note, Dunlop v. Bachowski and the Limits of Judicial Review under Title IV of
the LMRDA: A Proposal for Administrative Reform, 86 YALE L.J. 885, 887-88 nn.10-12
(1977) (courts have undertaken review of broad range of agency prosecutorial decisions
under Title IV of LMRDA).
160. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JusTIcr 22 (1969).
161. In Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 84-88 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975), the Third Circuit treated
the Secretary of Labor's prosecutorial discretion contention as an argument that his
decision not to bring suit to overturn a union election is action "committed to agency
discretion by law." The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's holding that the
Secretary's decision is reviewable and specifically approved its analysis of the prosecutorial
discretion issue. 421 U.S. at 567 n.7. See Mahinka, The Problem of Nonreviewability:
Judicial Control of Action Committed to Agency Discretion, 20 VILL. L. REv. 1, 25-35
(1974) (analyzing and criticizing prosecutorial discretion as a special problem under the
"committed to agency discretion" exception to reviewability).
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mitted to agency discretion by law."'16 2 The NLRA contains no
language specifically committing to the General Counsel's discretion
the decision not to issue a complaint. Nevertheless, this exception to
judicial review may be inferred if the relevant statutory language is so
broad as to provide a reviewing court with no standards to apply,163
or if judicial review would be so intrusive as to disrupt the administra-
tive process contemplated by the statute."', The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has described this exception to the rule of judicial review as
"very narrow."''1 3 Examination of the available statutory standards
and the administrative structure of the General Counsel's office in-
dicates that the exception should not be invoked here.
As noted above, the legislative history of § 3(d) evinces no congres-
sional intent to give the General Counsel unbridled discretion over
the issuance of complaints;' 0 6 what is more, Congress provided stan-
dards in the statute to rein his discretion. 167 Even in the absence of
explicit provisions such as those in the NLRA, the courts have been
able to discover clear guidelines through resourceful statutory in-
162. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970).
163. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945), reprinted in ADAIINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1944-46, at 185, 212 (1946) [hereinafter cited as
APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]: "If, for example, statutes are drawn in such broad terms that
in a given case there is no law to apply, courts of course have no statutory question to
review." See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
164. See, e.g., Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1250 (1st Cir. 1970) (adverse impact of
judicial review on agency effectiveness one factor in holding that courts should not review
FHA rent decisions); Saferstein, supra note 5, at 371, 377 (suggesting that agency's un-
reviewable discretion can be inferred from "general congressional scheme entrusted to
the agency-its subject matter, purpose, background, legislative history, and practice").
165. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); Kerr-
McGee Corp. v. Morton, 527 F.2d 838, 839 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (following Overton Park;
Secretary of Interior's decision to award oil and gas leases); Kelley v. Butz, 404 F. Supp.
925, 930 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (following Overton Park; U.S. Forest Service's decision to
spray defoliants in national forest).
It is arguable that Congress intended the "committed to agency discretion" exception
to be merely a limitation on the scope of review, rather than a bar to review altogether.
See H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 163, at 233, 275:
Matters of discretion are necessarily exempted from the section, since otherwise
courts would in effect supersede agency functioning. But that does not mean that
questions of law properly presented are withdrawn from reviewing courts. . . . In
any case the existence of discretion does not prevent a person from bringing a
review action but merely prevents him pro tanto from prevailing therein.
See also 92 CONG. REc. 2153-54 (1946), reprinted in id. at 295, 311 (colloquy between Sen.
McCarran, Senate sponsor of APA, and Sen. Donnell noting that provision for judicial
review for abuse of discretion supersedes "committed to agency discretion" exception to
review); Saferstein, supra note 5, at 372.
166. See p. 1353 & note 148 supra.
167. See pp. 1380-81 supra.
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terpretation.' 68 Indeed, the clarity that is held to be a precondition of
review has often been largely a judicial creation. In Bachowski v.
Brennan,1 9 for example, the Third Circuit decided that the language
of LMRDA § 402(b) 170 requires the Secretary of Labor to bring a
union election suit whenever he finds a member's complaint meritori-
ous; this finding, said the Court, entails a "rather straightforward
factual determination."' 171 In Adams v. Richardson, 72 the Court in-
ferred standards for review from the precision of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 in detailing specific enforcement procedures.'
73
Furthermore, judicial review of the General Counsel's refusal to
issue a complaint would not involve judicial interference with expert
judgments that Congress meant to be in the exclusive province of an
administrative agency. First, the Board, not the General Counsel, is
charged with expert policymaking under the Act. This policymaking
function has always been exercised in conjunction with reviewing
courts. Secondly, courts reviewing the General Counsel's decisions
need not-indeed should not-decide whether a violation of the statute
has occurred. Even if a court compels the issuance of a complaint, the
Board retains primary jurisdiction to decide its merits. Review of the
General Counsel's decision would focus instead on questions within
the peculiar expertise of courts: (1) Are the General Counsel's reasons
for not issuing the complaint clear and precise? (2) Are his reasons
consistent with the NLRA, Board and court precedents, and the Gen-
eral Counsel's own past policies? (3) Does the General Counsel's refusal
rest on a legal theory that the Board needs to address in order to
clarify the labor law?'
4
168. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)
(mandatory standards governing Secretary of Transportation's decisions to authorize
funding of highways through parks); Wong Wing Hang, v. INS, 360 F.2d 715 (2d Cir.
1966) (deriving standards governing deportation decision from agency policies and con-
gressional purpose). Cf. Saferstein, supra note 5, at 372 (courts have been flexible in
reviewing broad range of discretionary decisions).
169. 502 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
170. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970): "The Secretary shall investigate such complaint and,
if he finds probable cause to believe that a violation of this subchapter has occurred and
has not been remedied, he shall, within sixty days after the filing of such complaint,
bring a civil action against the labor organization ...." (emphasis added).
171. 502 F.2d at 88. On appeal, the Supreme Court failed to discuss explicitly the
standards governing the Secretary of Labor's decision not to bring a Title IV suit, but
the Court did incorporate the Third Circuit's analysis into its opinion. See 421 U.S. at
567 n.7 ("We agree with the Court ot Appeals, for the reasons stated in its opinion, ...
that there is no merit in the Secretary's contention that his decision is an unre;iewablc
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.")
172. 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
173. Id. at 1162 (construing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970)).
174. In Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, Local 1184 v. Ordman, 318 F. Supp.
633 (C.D. Cal. 1970), the General Counsel was ordered to investigate charges after he had
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Finally, there is no basis on which a court could infer from the
NLRB's administrative structure that judicial review is inconsistent
with congressional intent. The General Counsel exercises a screening
function much like that which the Secretary of Labor exercises over
union election complaints under Title IV of the LMRDA. Both have
exclusive power to initiate proceedings under the statutes they are
respectively charged with enforcing.7 5 In Dunlop v. Bachowski, the
Supreme Court held that the Secretary of Labor's screening function
is not impaired by judicial review of his initial decision not to com-
mence proceedings. 70 There is no reason for reaching a different
conclusion with respect to the General Counsel.
IV. Effective Judicial Scrutiny: Scope and Standards of Review
Having concluded that the General Counsel's decision not to issue
a complaint is reviewable, a court must determine the appropriate
scope of review. At a minimum, the reviewing court must examine the
General Counsel's reasons for his decision in order to ascertain that the
decision has an articulated basis. Beyond this, the court should analyze
the reasons statement to determine whether the decision is "arbitrary
or capricious," or in excess of the General Counsel's statutory author-
ity. If the court remands for additional reasons and the General
Counsel fails to take appropriate action or to justify his inaction,
judicial review can be effective only if the reviewing court is em-
powered to compel issuance of a complaint.
A. Review of Reasons Statement
Although there is no formal agency record for the reviewing court
to examine, it can require the General Counsel to provide the charg-
ing party with a statement outlining the reasons for his action and
refused to do so on the grounds that they had been filed too late. The Court held it
had the power to compel investigation because its order dealt only with a preliminary
question, not with whether a complaint should issue, and because the interpretation of
the time limit for filing complaints under NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970), is a
"purely legal question" (emphasis added).
175. Compare NLRA § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970), with LMRDA § 403, 29 U.S.C.
§ 483 (1970) ("The remedy provided by this subchapter [i.e., the Secretary's suit] for
challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive.") See Calhoon v. Harvey,
379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964) (Secretary of Labor has exclusive authority to initiate post-
election suit to remedy union election violations). Indeed, courts have granted judicial
review of the Secretary's decisions in part because "the very exclusivity of the remedy
serves to emphasize the necessity of some degree of Court supervision." Bachowski v.
Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1974) (quoting DeVito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381, 382
(D.D.C. 1969)).
176. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975). But see Note, supra note 159, at
889-96 (arguing that judicial review under Title IV of LMRDA does impair important
statutory goals).
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relating those reasons to administrative, judicial, or statutory author-
ity.177 The least intrusive form of judicial review demands that the
court scrutinize the reasons statement to ensure that it sufficiently
discloses the facts, policies, and statutory provisions on which the
General Counsel has relied. Under this form of review, a court may
remand the statement to the agency if it finds that the agency "has
not sufficiently rationalized its action or has used irrelevant or failed
to use relevant standards of judgment."' 78 By requiring the General
Counsel to explain inconsistencies or departures from earlier policy
and to reconsider inadequately articulated decisions, courts can ensure
that the General Counsel develops consistent standards to govern his
discretion. 179 Judicial scrutiny will protect against careless actions by
assuring that crucial facts and legal concepts are considered, 180 and
will direct political and administrative attention to the policy con-
siderations that may have influenced the General Counsel's judgment.
Currently there is little congressional awareness of how the General
Counsel interprets the NLRA. Greater familiarity with his interpreta-
tions would facilitate congressional oversight of his policy choices and
could lead to statutory clarification where necessary.' 8' The Board
may be little better informed on this score than Congress;' 8 2 were it
177. Even leaving aside the question of judicial review, the APA would seem to require
the General Counsel to give the charging party a statement of reasons when he declines
to proceed. The APA requires notice and *-a brief statement of the grounds" for agency
denial of "a written application, petition, or other request of an interested person made
in connection with any agency proceedings." 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (1970). "Agency proceed-
ings" include agency adjudications that result in an "order," id. § 551(7), (12), and the
decision of the General Counsel not to issue a complaint is an order. See note 137 supra.
Cf. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 593-94 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (§ 555(e)
requires Secretary of Labor to issue statement of reasons for not bringing suit). At
present, the General Counsel does provide the charging party with a statement of reasons
when he declines to issue an unfair labor practice complaint. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 101.6,
102.19 (1976).
178. JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 31, at 103. See, e.g., Bachowski v. Brennan, 405 F.
Supp. 1227, 1234 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (remanding reasons statement to Secretary for supple-
mentation because the original statement inadequately disclosed the rationale for his
decision).
179. Congressional critics have on occasion found such consistency wanting. See note
45 supra.
180. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 575 (1975); Childs v. United States Bd.
of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Leventhal, J., concurring).
181. For example, between 1947 and 1956 the General Counsel refused to issue com-
plaints against unions that engaged in organizational picketing after they had lost a
representation election. When the General Counsel finally issued a complaint on the
theory that § 8(b)(1)(A) barred such conduct, attention was drawn to the issue and
Congress acted to clarify the situation in 1959 by enacting § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)
(1970). See McGuiness, supra note 44, at 389-90.
182. The Board was evidently surprised to learn in connection with the Connell
Construction Co. antitrust litigation that the General Counsel had prevented it from
deciding the validity of certain subcontracting agreements. See 1975 NLRB Hearings,
supra note 25, at 41 (statement of NLRB Chairman Betty Murphy); pp. 1366-68 supra.
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better informed, the Board might be tempted to reassert its policy-
making authority by utilizing its rulemaking power.'8 3
Beyond requiring the General Counsel to provide detailed reasons
for not issuing a complaint, courts may review his reasons statements
under the APA to determine if he has exceeded his statutory
authority8 4 or if his decision constitutes an abuse of discretion, i.e., is
"arbitrary and capricious."'18 5 The first task of a reviewing court is to
define the ambit of the administrator's authority and discretion under
the statute." 6 As a rule, the General Counsel should issue a complaint
183. See Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations
Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729, 752-61 (1961). Once the Board had made a rule, the General
Counsel's failure to issue a complaint in accordance with it would be evidence of an
abuse of discretion.
184. See APA § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970):
The reviewing court shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be-
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short
of statutory right ....
185. See APA § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970):
The reviewing court shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law ....
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard is the basic formula for review of informal
agency action, i.e., action for which the APA requires no formal hearing and record.
See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140, 142 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-16 (1971). Cf. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 566
(1975) ("arbitrary and capricious" standard appropriate for review of Secretary of Labor's
decision not to file suit to set aside union election).
It is clear that a formulaic description of the standard of review does not necessarily
determine the intensity of the review undertaken. See 4 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw
TREATIsE 118 (1958). Occasionally review may be given an especially narrow compass in
order to prevent the court from substituting its judgment on issues properly left to the
administrator. The issues confronting the Secretary of Labor in enforcing Title IV
primarily concern inferences about the effects on union elections of conceded irregulari-
ties, issues upon which the Secretary can be expected to have substantial experience.
Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964). Accordingly, review has been limited to an
examination of the Secretary of Labor's reasons statement to determine whether his
decision was reached "for an impermissible reason or for no reason at all." Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 571-74 (1975). In contrast, the General Counsel's decisions
frequently involve legal issues within the traditional ambit of judicial expertise and
thus judicial scrutiny should be more intense. Moreover, the especially limited scope
of review in Bachowski was dictated by the special time pressures in Title IV suits
resulting from a congressional mandate to settle union election disputes "as quickly as
practicable." Id. at 573.
186. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971).
Cf. Safir v. Gibson, 417 F.2d 972, 976 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970)
(" 'Discretion . . . is not self defining; it does not arise parthenogenetically from 'broad'
phrases. Its contour is determined by the courts, which must define its scope and its
limit' ") (quoting JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 31, at 572).
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whenever the facts arguably constitute an unfair labor practice.'87 The
Act and its legislative history, decisions of the Board and courts, and
the General Counsel's own past policy' 88 provide objective standards
for making this determination. Specific statutory restrictions, for
example, limit the Board's power to decline jurisdiction over parties
on the grounds the business involved is too small to warrant atten-
tion;' 8 9 for this reason, courts should refuse to countenance a similar
justification for the General Counsel's declining to proceed. Similarly,
one may infer from cases involving review of informal settlement
orders that a purpose to effect a quick end to tensions between parties
is not a valid reason for refusing to issue a complaint when an un-
remedied violation of the Act has occurred.' 00
When courts can enunciate standards to govern an administrator's
discretion, the "scope of authority" and "arbitrary and capricious"
formulae have real bite. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe,' 9' for example, the Court found clear standards in § 4(f) of
the Transportation Act of 1966,192 which prohibits the authorization
of funds to finance construction of highways through parks where a
"feasible" and "prudent" alternative route exists. Rejecting the Secre-
tary of Transportation's argument that the statute required the discre-
tionary balancing of many factors, the Court held that authorization
is permitted only where "as a matter of sound engineering it would
not be feasible to build the highway along any other route."'u 3 Al-
though the Secretary's decision was entitled to a presumption of
regularity, that presumption could not operate to shield his determina-
tion from a "thorough, probing, and in-depth review."'
94
187. See note 148 supra. There may be some reasons, apart from a determination that
no unfair labor practice has occurred, for a refusal to issue a complaint. Deference to a
completed or ongoing arbitration proceeding might be such a reason. See Collyer
Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 830, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971) (Board will defer to future
arbitration where employer conddct complained of allegedly violated both § 8(a)(5), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970), and the collective bargaining agreement).
188. Particularly relevant would be the General Counsel's "policy" of issuing com-
plaints in close cases. See notes 44, 48 & 73 supra. Moreover, the General Counsel's
Advice and Appeals Memoranda constitute agency policy if they pertain to denial of
a complaint. See note 67 supra.
189. See p. 1380 & note 143 supra.
190. See, e.g., Leeds & Northrup Co. v. NLRB, 357 F.2d 527, 536 (3d Cir. 1966)
(where important issues of labor policy are at stake, General Counsel cannot settle com-
plaint without adjudicative hearing).
191. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
192. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
193. 401 U.S. at 411.
194. Id. at 415. The district court on remand was authorized even to question the
administrators in order to discern how they had construed the administrative record
before them. Id. at 420. The Secretary reconsidered his decision after a hearing in the
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To say that judicial review of the General Counsel's decisions
should be incisive, however, is not to suggest that it will be boundless.
The General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint is informal agency
action, i.e., action without an adjudicative hearing. Hence, courts will
not review the General Counsel's statement to determine whether it is
supported by substantial evidence, nor will they conduct a de novo
factual inquiry.1 5 The General Counsel's findings of fact, in other
words, will be binding on the reviewing court.' 96 This will pose no
problem, since a primary purpose of judicial review will be to en-
courage the General Counsel to develop new areas of law for the
Board's consideration. 1
0 7
B. Compelling the Issuance of a Complaint
If a court finds the General Counsel's reasons statement inadequate,
it may remand for appropriate action. In the rare case in which the
General Counsel subsequently fails to issue a complaint or to supply
the court with suitable reasons for not doing so, effective judicial
review requires that the court be able to compel the General Counsel
to proceed.
In Dunlop v. Bachowski,1g8 the Supreme Court mentioned several
objections to a judicial order compelling the Secretary of Labor to
district court and reversed his earlier approval of the Overton Park route. See Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 991 (1975).
195. Cf., e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140-42 (1973) (Comptroller of the Cur-
rency's decision, not based on formal agency action or hearing, is reviewable only under
"arbitrary and capricious" standard, not reviewable under "substantial evidence" stan-
dard, and reviewing court may undertake no de novo factual inquiry).
196. But see Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 574 (1975) (suggesting that de novo
review of informal agency action would be permitted where an administration's decision
is " 'plainly beyond the bounds of the [statute or] clearly defiant of the [statute]' ")
(quoting DeVito v. Shultz, 72 L.R.R.M. 2682, 2682 (D.D.C. 1969)).
197. See pp. 1361-71 supra. Distinctions between law and fact, of course, may not
always be clear, and the General Counsel's classification does not bind a reviewing
court. For example, in an unfair labor practice case involving employer activity before
a union representation election, the General Counsel may conclude that sufficient
evidence of a violation does not exist. This apparently factual determination may
implicate one of two different findings: (1) the alleged activities never occurred, or (2)
the actions did occur but had no effect on the election. In the latter event, the case is
perhaps one for the Board, for the Board may derive from the statute a per se rule
against certain employer actions. The General Counsel's failure to issue a complaint based
upon the second type of "factual" determination could thus be erroneous as a matter of
law. Cf. Bachowski v. Brennan, 413 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 545 F.2d
363 (3d Cir. 1976) (distinguishing between Secretary of Labor's findings of union election
irregularities and his inferences as to what effect those irregularities may have had on
the election's outcome).
198. 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
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bring suit in a union election case.'0 9 Those objections, both statutory
and constitutional, apply with considerably less force to the General
Counsel. The statutory issue raised in Bachowski was whether "the
strong evidence that Congress deliberately gave exclusive enforcement
authority to the Secretary" precluded a court from ordering him to
bring suit.2 00 In contrast, the broad policymaking and exclusive en-
forcement authority under the NLRA is vested in the Board; the Gen-
eral Counsel's discretion is limited to determining whether the Board
will probably take jurisdiction to adjudicate a particular controversy.
The major constitutional issue raised in Bachowski was whether
"Articles II and III . . . 'countenance a court order requiring the execu-
tive branch, against its wishes, to institute a lawsuit in federal
court.' "201 The General Counsel's decision whether to issue a com-
plaint, however, is merely the first step in an agency process; by com-
pelling the General Counsel to initiate that process, a court would not
usurp the Board's enforcement authority, nor would it dictate to the
Board what result it must reach.
Ample precedent exists for compelling the issuance of a complaint.
Courts in numerous cases have ordered agency action analogous to the
General Counsel's issuance of a complaint.20 2 In Adams v. Richard-
son,20 3 for example, the Court distinguished between compelling an
199. Id. at 575-76 (leaving open question whether reviewing court can compel Secre-
tary to file Tile IV suit). See generally Note, supra note 159, at 900-03 (arguing that
Secretary's broad statutory discretion and notions of separation of powers preclude
courts from compelling Secretary to bring suit). In a separate opinion, Justice Rehnquist
forcefully asserted that the majority's logic presupposed an affirmative answer to that
question. 421 U.S. at 592 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting
in part). Indeed, the majority's adjuration to lower courts that they "must be mindful
... that endless litigation concerning the sufficiency of the [Secretary's reasons] statement
is inconsistent with the statute's goal of expeditious resolution of post-election disputes,"
id. at 574-75, could be taken to indicate that a court should compel suit if the Secretary
showed himself incapable of producing an adequate statement of reasons.
200. Id. at 575.
201. Id. at 575 n.12. Cf. Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 nn.18 & 19 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(judicial usurpation of prosecutor's "executive function of deciding whether a particular
alleged violator should be prosecuted" contravenes "Art. II, § 3 of the Constitution,
which charges the President to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed' ").
A second constitutional argument urged in Bachowski was that a judicially compelled
lawsuit would lack " 'the requisite adversity of interest to constitute a "case" or "con-
troversy" as required by Article III,'" inasmuch as the Secretary and union would agree
that no new election was required. 421 U.S. at 575 n.12. This argument has no relevance
to the issue of compelling the General Counsel to initiate proceedings before the Board,
since the Board is not an Article III court and is subject to no "case" or "controversy"
requirement.
202. Cf. APA § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1970):
The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed . . ..
203. 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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agency to commence proceedings and dictating the outcome of those
proceedings.20 4 It ordered the Secretary of HEW to commence pro-
ceedings that might lead to termination of certain school funding.
The CAB was ordered in Trailways of New England, Inc. v. CAB205 to
initiate investigatory proceedings to determine whether certain airline
fares were unjustly discriminatory. In Templeton v. Dixie Color
Printing Co.,20 6 the Fifth Circuit held unlawful the NLRB's refusal to
proceed with a decertification petition and compelled the agency to
"proceed forthwith to perform its duties" of investigation and ad-
judication.2 17 The court was careful to distinguish this order from
one directly ordering decertification and a new representation elec-
tion.208 Finally, an Eighth Circuit decision, Terminal Freight Han-
dling Co. v. Solien,20 9 suggests that a Regional Director can be com-
pelled to seek an injunction in an unfair labor practice case under
NLRA § 10(l).210
Judicial power to compel a complaint is necessary if judicial review
of the General Counsel is to be effective.21' First, it is possible that the
General Counsel, regarding his original decision as valid and well-
considered, may respond to successive remands by providing successive
post hoc rationalizations in a protracted struggle to uphold his posi-
204. Id. at 1163-64.
205. 412 F.2d 926 (1st Cir. 1969).
206. 444 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1971).
207. Id. at 1066. Templeton involved representation cases, which are initiated by the
Board itself; the General Counsel initiates unfair labor practice cases. Since the Board
in Templeton was performing prosecutorial duties analogous to those performed by the
General Counsel in unfair labor practice cases, Templeton suggests that no "separation
of powers" problems inhere in a court's ordering the General Counsel to bring an issue
before the Board.
208. Id. at 1066-67.
209. 444 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 996 (1972) (construing 29
U.S.C. § 158(l) (1970)).
210. The court held that if the Regional Director determines that charges are true
and cannot obtain cessation of the activity, he must petition for a temporary injunction.
Id. at 708. Because the action was one for declaratory judgment, the issue of the court's
power to compel the Regional Director was not decided. Id. at 709-10.
211. Notwithstanding its power to compel action by the General Counsel, a court
should usually remand an inadequate reasons statement. If the statement inadequately
discloses his reasons for refusing to issue the complaint, the General Counsel should
have a chance to supplement his statement. If the statement is "arbitrary and
capricious," the General Counsel should have a chance to investigate the charge further
or reconsider his decision in the light of the court's misgivings. But when the General
Counsel fails to "proceed appropriately" a reviewing court should compel issuance of
the complaint. Cf. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 574-76 (1975). Constant remands
must be avoided, for they ill serve the goals of the NLRA and judicial review. Cf.
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098-1100 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(remanding Secretary of Agriculture's refusal to suspend registration of pesticides, with
implication that court would compel suspension if further judicial relief were necessary).
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tion. Such a stalemate would undermine judicial review and dis-
courage litigants from testing the General Counsel's decisions.
212
More importantly, there may be cases in which the General Counsel
has given a reasonable statutory interpretation on an issue for which
precedent is slight or conflicting. Since the absence of a statutory
violation is an adequate ground for refusing to issue a complaint and
the court cannot say that the General Counsel's interpretation is
clearly wrong, a remand serves no purpose. Yet to affirm the Gen-
eral Counsel's decisions whenever they are arguably correct is to make
him the final arbiter of the NLRA when new issues arise. To protect
the NLRB's policymaking authority, the reviewing court must be
allowed to overturn the General Counsel's refusal to bring new issues
before the Board.213
The importance of preserving the Board's policymaking authority,
-2 14
of course, does not require the issuance of a complaint whenever the
legal rule applied by the General Counsel is "arguably" inapposite.
Otherwise, the General Counsel would serve no screening function at
all. The factors that should enter into a court's decision to compel
issuance of a complaint resemble those that govern the Supreme
Court's decision to grant certiorari. A reviewing court should consider
212. Cf. Trailways of New England, Inc. v. CAB, 412 F.2d 926 (Ist Cir. 1969) (rather
than remanding the case, court ordered the CAB to conduct the investigation that com-
plainant requested).
213. Obviously, it is harder to overrule arguably correct statutory interpretations by
the General Counsel under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review than to
overturn a decision predicated on factors inconsistent with his prior handling of charges
or patently at odds with current law. The rationale for requiring the General Counsel
to bring important new issues before the Board parallels the view expressed by Learned
Hand in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785, 789 (2d Cir. 1946):
[T]he position of a public officer, charged with the enforcement of a law, is different
from one who must decide a dispute. If there is a fair doubt, his duty is to present
the case for the side which he represents, and leave decision to the court, or the
administrative tribunal, upon which lies the responsibility of decision. If he sur-
renders a plausible construction, it will, at least it may, be surrendered forever; and
yet it might be right.
In Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154, 1175 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), the court warned that repeated attempts by an
administrative body to avoid resolution of a difficult issue may constitute an abuse of
discretion. For discussion of the Connell litigation, see p. 1365 supra.
214. One indication of Congress's desire to preserve the Board's policymaking func-
tions is its rejection of Reorganization Plan No. 5 in 1961. The Plan would have made
the hearing examiner's decision final unless two Board members voted to hear the case.
Congress rejected the Plan because it feared that the Plan would remove important
decisions from the hands of those to whom Congress had expressly delegated policy-
making authority. See 107 CONG. REC. 10223 (1961) (Senator Dirksen); Pepsi-Cola Buffalo
Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 676, 680-81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969).
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the novelty and difficulty of the legal issue decided by the General
Counsel, its significance and relevance to the policies embodied in the
NLRA, and the importance of the outcome to the private parties in-
volved. The court should not resolve the question, but decide only
whether it is one the Board should hear.
215
215. There are other circumstances in which courts grant limited relief prior to the
Board's disposition on the merits. Under NLRA §§ 10j), (1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(j), (1) (1970),
courts may grant injunctive relief in certain specified instances prior to a Board ruling.
In ruling upon motions for injunctive relief, the courts have stressed that they do not
decide the merits of the charge. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n
Local 108, 289 F. Supp. 65, 87-89 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
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